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This thesis examines four important international bilateral rela-
tionships which were significant during the process of Spanish
accession to .NATO, focusing on one particular issue in each of tne
four relationships. The relationships and issues examined are:
1. _pain and the Soviet Union, with emphasis on Soviet attempts
to hinder the process of accession.
2. Spain and Britain, and the question of Gibraltar.
3. S H ain and Portugal, and the prospective restructuring of tne
NATO military command.
4. Spain and the Federal Republic of Germany, stressing NATO
strategy for the defense of the Central Front.
The thesis discusses the interaction of interests in eacn relation-
ship, and the effects of each issue on the accession process. Conclu-
sions are drawn regarding the probable resolution of each issue if
Spain is fully integrated into NATO, and possible implications of eacn
relationship for long term Alliance conesion are discussed.
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The accession process which will bring Spain full membership in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is nearly complete. Ratifica-
tion of the protocol of accession by NATO's fifteen member states will
mark the completion of a major phase in the Spanisn Government's program
to move Spain into a role as a full partner in tne community of western
European nations. For Spain, association with "the democratic alliance"
will demonstrate to the world the depth of the nation's commitment to
democratic government. Accession also will bespeak recognition by other
European states of Spain's legitimate place in the Western community,
recognition which was withheld during the long rule of Generalissimo
Francisco Franco. The majority Union del Centro Democratica party is
counting on the prestige associated with this recognition to generate
the domestic support it needs to retain control of the government and
to press ahead with its other programs.
Spanish accession also will have strategic and political advantages
for the alliance, Spain's dominant position in Iberia, fronting both
the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, will shore up NATO's weak southern
flank and help secure control of the approacnes to the Mediterranean
and central Europe from North America and the South Atlantic. Incor-
poration of Spain into NATO plans for the defense of Europe will add
significantly to the strategic depth available for theater ground and
air operations. The Spanish Armed Forces will add over 300,000 men

to .NATO manpower roles. Although not equipped with the most modern
weapons, the Spanish Army is the fourth largest in Western Europe.
The air and naval forces, more moderate in size, operate with better
equipment and are capable of making an immediate contribution to NATO
defense. Remaps even more important will be the psychological lift
which Spanish accession will bring to an alliance which many see as
troubled and ineffective.
Yet, despite the apparent advantages for both Spain and NATO,
the accession process has not proceeded without difficulties. The key
to understanding these difficulties lies in knowing the type of asso-
ciation which NATO represents, and the historical relationships between
the Alliance partners. This essay does not discuss all of the inter-
national political issues which have been raised during the accession
process; instead, it focuses at some length on four of the key bilateral
relationships involved, and examines in detail the effect of each on
the complex multilateral process. However, before presenting the four
relationships chosen for study, a brief discussion of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and the evolution of the accession process is in order.
3. WHAT IS NATO?
Some have proclaimed that NATO represents more than a mere military
coalition. They assert that NATO represents the embodiment of ideals
of Western interdependence which transcend defense requirements to
include a common economic and cultural heritage, and, most importantly,
a tradition of democratic government. Some see in the North Atlantic
Council a forum for the formulation of a consensus on foreign policy
which will serve as the common expression of that democratic tradition.
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They seek to make NATO a supranational organization which transcends the
politics of nationalism and replaces them with the ideals of Western
democracy. But in fact, initially NATO did not intend to be all of
these things, nor have the Allies been able to achieve the high degree
of consensus implied by these ideals.
First and foremost, NATO is a security alliance. The opening
sentences of the explanation of the Organization found in the NATO
Handbook read as follows:
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization serves a defensive
Alliance which maintains military preparedness in order to
prevent war. It is an intergovernmental, not a supranational
organization, in which member states retain their full sover-
eignty and independence. The political task of NATO is to
provide for consultation on all political problems of rele-
vance to its members or to the Alliance as a whole and give
direction to the military side of the Organization. L^ef. 1]
The operative phrases in this description are "intergovernmental"
and "consultation". The former stresses that the Alliance is a free
association of sovereign states which retain, and are expected to
exercise, their full prerogatives regarding issues which affect their
national interests. There is no requirement, legal or moral, for
Alliance members to form and adhere to consensus positions regarding
issues of common interest. The latter phrase prescribes the limits
of the Alliance's political functions: i.e., to provide a forum for
consultation regarding issues of common interest. The North Atlantic
Council is not a democratic institution in the sense that a majority
may formulate policy for the whole. It is merely a forum for consul-




Every attempt to expand the scope of Western political collabora-
tion has failed. Canadian proposals that the original North Atlantic
Treaty include provisions for cultural, economic, and social cooper-
ation were rejected and replaced by the more nebulous provisions of
Article 2, which merely provide that one objective of the Organization
will be the encouragement of economic collaboration.
Oe Gaulle's September 1958 proposal for a directorate composed of
France, Britain, and the United States to shape common Western policy
was rejected. So too were Henry Kissinger's 1965 proposals for the
creation of a political body to shape "a common foreign policy" for
the Atlantic community. [Ref. 2]
Although each member nation recognizes the value of the security
guarantee offered by the Alliance, none has ever been anxious to sur-
render its option for independent decisionmaking. This reluctance can
be found even in Article 5, the operative article of the NATO security
agreement, with regard to common military action. Contrary to widely
held belief, Article 5 does not require military action by all members
in response to an attack on any one. Rather, the article provides
that "each of them . . .will assist the Party or Parties so attacked
by taking forthwith . . . such action as it deems necessary ... to
restore the security of the North Atlantic area". [Ref. 3] Even in
the area of security, national prerogatives are maintained.
C, PROBLEMS OF ALLIANCE COHESION
For the most part, the Alliance continues to perform well in its
primary function as a security pact. But as a forum for shaping a
Western policy consensus on any issue it must be remembered that,
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even at best, common policy will be a compromise between optimum
security considerations and minimum political autonomy. In The
Politics of the Atlantic Alliance
, Cottrell and Dougherty point out
that:
. . .
even the staunchest allies can at times disagree rather
seriously over political objectives and approaches; this is
to be accepted. All the NATO members have behind them long
and proud national traditions. All of them are jealous of
their national sovereign prerogatives. [Ref. 4]
Cottrell and Dougherty go on to compare the Alliance states with U.S.
political parties, where each is beset by frequently conflicting desires
to cooperate so as to achieve common goals while simultaneously seeking
to avoid any sacrifice of individual interest or identity.
Historically, the member states of NATO have placed their own
political interests above common security interests. An early illustra-
tion of this phenomenon is found in the search for a formula for the
rearmament of Germany following World War II. It was only extreme
pressure (coupled with reassurances) from the Americans and the British
which persuaded the French to accept German rearmament and accession to
NATO following the failure of the European Defense Community proposals.
Disagreements concerning the timing and manner of terminating European
colonialism created great rifts in the fabric of the Alliance. The
French were particularly perturbed about the failure of their allies
to provide moral and material backing for their involvement in Indo-
China and, later, Algeria. In the 1970*s, Portugal was faced with the
loss of its colonies in Africa and, as before, received no support from
the Alliance. Such a list of issues of contention could be extended
indefinitely. The "Cod Wars" between Iceland and Britain, the Greek-
Turkish disputes and the conflict over Cyprus, American involvement
13

in Vietnam, inconsistent policies concerning Western support for Israel,
failure to implement coherent energy and nuclear weapons strategies,
and failure to form a common response to events in Afghanistan and
Poland loom as major examples.
As long as the perception of military threat remains low, there is
no reason to believe that the nations of NATO will not continue to uehavc
as individual actors rather than as a unit in shaping foreign policy.
Understanding this central fact regarding the relationships of the
member states of the Alliance is central to understanding the problems
which arise around ewery major issue which NATO faces. Only in excep-
tional cases will the interests of even a majority of tne states exactly
coincide. The question of Spanisn accession has been no exception.
D. STAGES IN THE ACCESSION PROCESS
Under the dictatorial government of Francisco Franco, Spain was
a political outcast in postwar Europe, --\ltnough ^ATO membership was
periodically proposed by the United States for purely pragmatic reasons,
the liberal, protestant states in Scandinavia and the Low Countries
were emphatic in their opposition to membership for Fascist Spain. Only
Portugal, under the dictatorship of Salazar, joined the United States
in support for Spanish accession. That the Portuguese themselves had
been invited to join the Alliance was a close question. ,,ad the United
States not insisted that the Portuguese Azores were absolutely critical
to the security of the Atlantic link, even Portugal's Jest-leaning
neutrality during World .4ar II would not have secured aer membership
over the objections of Alliance liberals. Spain, on the other hand,
nad no such strategic monopoly to use as bargaining leverage, and
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Franco's close association with Hitler both uefore and during the war
absolutely confirmed Spain's isolation.
With the death of Franco in November 1975, Spain began a transition
toward democratic government, Under the leadership of King Juan Carlos I
and his Prime Minister, Adolfo Suarez, the nation moved quickly to
break from the dictatorial traditions of the previous 36 years. Elections
held in 1977 confirmed the King's appointment of Suarez as Prime Minister
and brought a coalition of the moderate political center, the Union del
Centro Democratica (UCD), into power as the majority party in government.
Another election in March 1979, three months after the adoption of tne
new democratic constitution, reconfirmed the UCD's position.
The keystone of Suarez' foreign policy was the full integration of
Spain into the Western community of nations. The major milestones in
achieving this goal were to be membership in the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Membership in
the EEC was the first objective, for this initiative enjoyed broad
support by all of Spain's major political parties, including the Communists
Membership in NATO was approached much more cautiously, for it was
opposed by both the Spanish Socialist Worker's Party (PSOE) and the
recently lega)ized Communist Party of Spain (PCE). The ilATO issue was
viewed as potentially destabilizing by Spain's Government, which wished
to consolidate its position before undertaking any controversial programs.
Spain submitted its formal application for EEC membership in July
1977, with tne hope that it would receive quick and favorable consider-
ation. But the process has been much slower than expected, and negotia-
tions are still not completed on the question of Spanish entry. Problems
15

center around Frencn and Italian concern for the impact of Spanish
agricultural goods on their domestic markets, around the allocation of
Atlantic fishing quotas, and around the failure of Spain to complete
the internal currency and taxation reforms (particularly the Value
Added Tax) necessary to comply with EEC standards.
Application for membership in NATO remained a more distant goal of
the Suarsz government. The Prime Minister was most concerned about
pursuing an objective which was sure to be politically divisive at a
time when cooperation between the nation's dominant political parties was
essential to the resolution of the immediate problems of regional autonomy
and democratic reform. No imminent threat to Spanish security made
immediate Alliance membership imperative, and Spain already had a
bilateral agreement with the United States whicn, although not a firm
written commitment, the Spanish believed would oblige the U.S. to aid
in the defense of Spain against outside agression. Suarez initially
maintained that membership in NATO should follow membership in the EEC,
but as the EEC negotiations dragged out it was announced that Spain
might apply to NATO as early as 1981, with membership expected in 1983.
This announcement came from the office of the Foreign Minister, but was
never confirmed by the Prime Minister's office. [Ref. 5]
Two events in early 1981 dramatically changed the course of Spanish
foreign policy. The first was the resignation of Adolfo Suarez and the
nomination of the more conservative Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo as his succes-
sor. The second was the coup attempt of February 23. Although the
attempt was unsuccessful, subsequent events revealed that Colonel
Tejero's perniciousness represented only the leading edge of much
16

broader discontent among the nation's powerful conservatives. The
main focus of the discontent was what the conservatives perceived as
government "softness" on autonomy issues and regional terrorism, but
there was general nationwide dissatisfaction with increasing lawless-
ness and a breakdown of traditional family and Church authority.
Calvo-Sotelo feared that conservative reaction represented a real
threat to the stability of the democracy, yet he depended on a political
alliance with the conservative Popular Alliance to maintain his parlia-
mentary majority. Restrained therefore from moving directly against
the military, which was the base of conservative power, Calvo-Sotelo
sought a diversionary strategy, a means of redirecting military atten-
tion away from the internal affairs of the state, i-lembership in NATO
offered such a diversion.
Calvo-Sotelo announced his intention to accelerate the accession
process in his confirmation speech to the Cortes. In June the Prime
Minister requested guidance from the State Council, the nation's chief
constitutional advisory body, regarding requirements concerning the
application procedure. The State Council delivered a favorable opinion
in August, declaring that an application for NATO membership need not
be submitted to public referendum as the PSOE had demanded, but could
be approved by parliamentary action. The government immediately applied
to the Cortes for permission to file such an application. Both the
Chamber of Deputies (on October 29) and the Spanish Senate (on November
26) passed measures favoring the request in late autumn, with the UCD
being supported by members of the Popular Alliance and 3asque and
Catalan regional parties. On December 3 the government submitted its
17

application to the North Atlantic Council which, at its 10 Decemoer
session, voted in favor of extending Spain an invitation for membership.
Following the Council's action, each member nation must take action
to ratify the invitation. Ratification by all members will be required
to make the invitation effective. The instruments of ratification will
be deposited with the United States Archives, the Custodian of the Treaty.
The United States Government will notify all members that the invita-
tion has been ratified when the last of the ratification instruments nas
been received in Washington, and then formally extend the invitation to
Spain, .ihen the Spanish Government communicates to Washington its
acceptance of the invitation, the accession process .vill be complete.
It is widely hoped that this will occur prior to the .lay 1932 meeting
of the North Atlantic Council at the .Ministerial level, thus allowing
Spain's Foreign Minister to participate in the meeting and be 'welcomed
into the Alliance.
The Spanish Government has made a major political investment in
the NATO issue. Its victory over domestic opposition from the Social-
ists, the Communists, and certain elements within the Army was not
easily won. Calvo-Sotelo has shown much greater concern for the
interests of the conservative right than his predecessor, both to
reduce agitation for military action by the right, and to win Army
support for NATO membership. His government is dependent upon an
alliance with the conservative Popular Alliance to maintain its parlia-
mentary majority, but as a result of his attention to the conservatives,
the UCD has been losing support among its liberal elements. Fifteen
members of the liberal social democratic element walked out of the
government in November to found their own Democratic Action Party.
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Suarez, himself a member of the social democratic wing of the UCD,
has quietly questioned the wisdom of dividing the nation on the NATO
issue at this time, and agrees that Calvo-Sotelo has been too attentive
to the conservatives since taking office. There are some observers who
forsee the realignment of Spain's political parties largely as a result
of the NATO debate, with a new coalition of liberal and socialist
elements dominating a left-of-center movement. [Ref. 6]
The UCD has not fared well in recent regional elections, and is
not expected to do well in the elections scheduled for this spring in
Andalusia. National elections are not scheduled until 1983, but rumors
have surfaced that Calvo-Sotelo will call for general elections in the
fall of 1982, Clearly, he is counting on prestige generated by suc-
cessful ratification of NATO accession to bolster his party's domestic
popularity. Thus far it appears that his gamble may pay off.
E. SELECTION OF ISSUES FOR STUDY
The preceding section provided a brief background discussion of the
domestic political issues in Spain surrounding the accession process.
The remainder of the thesis will focus on international political
issues surrounding the process. The thesis seeks to outline and explain
the position of each of four concerned foreign governments, relating
each state's position to national interests and historical development;
it attempts to show how the interests of the various states have inter-
acted during the accession process and, in addition, offers conclusions
regarding the further effects which each issue may have on the eventual
integration of Spain into NATO and on long term Alliance cohesion. The
four governments chosen for study—the U.S.S.R. , Britain, Portugal, and
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the Federal Republic of Germany—were selected because their views,
and the issues they raise, relate directly to the Alliance's ability
to fulfill its primary responsibility as the guarantor of Western
European security.
The second chapter of the thesis therefore deals with the attempts
of the Soviet Union to influence the accession process. The chapter opens
with a discussion of Soviet interests with regard to Spanish membership
in NATO, and continues with an analysis of the strategy adopted by the
Soviets to pursue their objectives. Conclusions are drawn regarding the
effectiveness of the Soviet strategy and implications for longer term
Soviet influence in Alliance relations.
Chapter III discusses the historical dispute between Spain and Great
Britain over Gibraltar, emphasizing the interaction since 1975 between
this issue and the accession process. A major point raised in this
chapter centers on the attempt by both Spain and Britain to use the North
Atlantic Alliance as a framework on which to build a compromise solution
to the Gibraltar question. The implications for NATO of such a plan are
analyzed, particularly with regard to the probability that a solution
satisfactory to all parties can be reached in the near future. The
chapter also discusses the effect of the Gibraltar issue on the realign-
ment of NATO's military command structure, providing background in this
instance for the following chapter.
The relationship which will most dramatically influence the restruc-
turing of the NATO military organization will be the relationship
between Spain and Portugal. Chapter IV examines this relationship in
some detail, explaining its historical evolution and why it will be
so important in determining new command relationships. The closing
20

section of the chapter offers one possible outline for a new NATO
command structure.
The final issue to be examined involves the effect which Spanish
accession might have on NATO strategy for the defense of the Central
European Front, the predominant concern of the Federal Republic of
Germany, With the Spanish Government eager to find a meaningful NATO
role for its Army, and at the same time, NATO leadership concerned
about its ability to execute Alliance defense strategy successfully,
it would seem that a mutually advantageous solution might be possible.
Chapter V examines this possibility.
Many other issues warrant further investigation, but not all are
explored in this thesis. For example, the phenomenon of European
Socialist solidarity might be examined in order to understand why
Greek and Dutch Socialist parties feel strongly that they should sup-
port PSOE objections to NATO membership while the Socialist parties
of France and the Federal Republic of Germany strongly favor accession.
Another topic of interest would be the status of the Spanish enclaves
in North Africa under the North Atlantic Treaty. A special protocol
will be required to include the enclaves under the defensive umbrella
of NATO, and the Spanish hope fervently to convince the Alliance that
such a protocol is justified. And, of course, a major question not
touched on by this thesis is the interest of the United States in
Spain, particularly with regard to changes in the bilateral relation-
ships between the two nations following Spanish accession.
21

II. SOVIET INFLUENCE AND THE ACCESSION PROCESS
A. OVERVIEW
The Soviet Union is the one state outside of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization whose national interests have been most directly affected by
Spain's move toward NATO. Psychologically, Spain's desire for associa-
tion with the Western Alliance could boost sagging morale and self-confi-
dence within NATO at a time when Alliance cohesion is being sorely tested
by various challenges, particularly including issues of Intermediate
Nuclear Weapons Modernization.
Ideologically, the Soviets fear that Spain's peaceful transition from
dictatorship to democracy could provide an alternative model to the
politics of terrorism and violence which they promote in the Third World.
A complete and successful transition could have a particularly strong
effect in Latin America where Spanish influence is most significant.
[Ref. 7]
Strategically, the Soviets have claimed that the integration of
Spain into NATO would "influence the correlation of forces which has
been created in Europe and lead in the end to the aggravation of inter-
national tension and the spurring of the arms race". [Ref. 8] Western
leaders have disputed such claims pointing out that accession will only
formalize the bilateral relationship between Spain and the United States
which has existed since 1953. Yet there can be no doubt that Spain's
membership in the Alliance will serve to bind it more tightly to its




Soviet attempts to influence Western European decisionmaking are
neither new nor unusual. An example which parallels the question of
Spanish accession is provided by the Soviet response to NATO's last
expansion--the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955.
Adam Ulam discusses the breadth and variety of tactics employed by
the Soviets to prevent this development:
... a veritable barrage of Soviet diplomatic notes continued
to attempt first to prevent West Germany's accession to NATO,
and then to undo it. At one time, and rather humorously, the
Soviets proposed their own joining of the Western defense or-
ganization. At other times, as in the note of October 23 with
German entrance into NATO imminent, the Soviet Government held
out the alluring prospect of discussing the Western proposals
for all -German elections, as well as the Austrian peace treaty
and atomic disarmament. [Ref. 9]
Finally, when all diplomatic efforts to foil German accession
appeared doomed, the Soviets convened their own conference on European
security in November 1954. From this conference emerged the Warsaw
Treaty Organization, and bilateral agreements for the permanent main-
tenance of Soviet troops on Hungarian and Romanian soil. These
developments have been viewed as a direct reaction to the expansion
of NATO through the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany.
[Ref. 10]
Given the high level of Soviet interest in the direction of polit-
ical development in Spain, and the past history of Soviet involvement
in the affairs of the Western European community, Soviet initiatives
aimed at influencing the Spanish accession process have materialized
largely as should have been expected. The initiatives have been
directed toward three targets and have met with varying degrees of
success. The least successful Soviet initiatives have attempted to
influence the Spanish Government directly. Initiatives aimed at
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persuading the nations of Western Europe that Spanish accession would
not be in the best interests of the community have been equally unsuc-
cessful. Only in the third area, the indirect exercise of influence
through the Spanish domestic political process, have developments
proceeded in a way which paralleled Soviet objectives.
This chapter will review the Soviet initiatives in each of the
three areas, assess the effectiveness of these initiatives in achieving
their objectives, and discuss the implications of the initiatives for
the future exercise of Soviet influence in Spanish and Alliance politics.
3. DIPLOMATIC COURTSHIP OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT
Amid a great deal of flattering international rhetoric, formal
diplomatic relations between Spain and the Soviet Union were reestab- —
lished on February 9, 1977, for the first time since the days of the
"Blue Division" in World War II. Much of the Soviet rhetoric dwelt
on the "reasonable" policies of the government of Prime Minister
Adolpho Suarez, which the Soviets praised as contributing to "fruitful
cooperation among states with different systems" [Ref. 11], and on
the sympathy of the Soviet people for the "heroic struggle of the
Spanish people against the dictatorship". [Ref. 12]. The Soviet Union
wasted no time in expanding trade agreements involving the delivery of
Soviet machinery and the purchase of Spanish steel, wine, footwear,
and vegetable oil. According to Newsweek magazine, as early as 1977
the Soviets offered to sweeten the pot further by signing favorable
contracts with Spanish shipyards on the condition that Spain stay
out of NATO. [Ref. 13]
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At the invitation of the Soviet Government, Spanish Foreign Minister
Oreja Aguirre visited Moscow in January 1979. During his visit he held
extensive meetings with Soviet Foreign .Minister Gromyko, and was
received by both Prime Minister Kosygin and President Brezhnev. In
November 1979 Mr. Gromyko visited Spain, at which time he and Oreja
concluded several agreements on cultural, scientific, technological and
communications cooperation. [Ref. 14] The TASS communique which
followed the meetings stressed that one of the important achievements
of the new Spanish Government "was the restoration of relations with
the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. ... In particular,
the country (Spain) remains at present outside of NATO". [Ref. 15]
A constant theme in Soviet diplomatic and press coverage of the emerg-
ing Spanish democracy was the positive value of nonalignment, and the
need to develop stronger cultural and economic ties between Spain and
the Socialist states of Eastern Europe.
Trade between the Soviet Union and Spain expanded dramatically
during the 1970's. By Soviet calculations, the commodity turnover
between the two states amounted to 403 million rubles in 1980, compared
to only 13,4 million rubles in 1970. Recent growth in Spanish impor-
tation of tractors, energy and energy related equipment, machinery,
and mining equipment has been significant. The Soviet Union has con-
cluded an agreement for uranium enrichment to fuel Spanish nuclear
reactors. Negotiations are in progress for production-sharing and
joint-stock agreements between the two states. [Ref. 16]
But trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe still amounts
to a small fraction of Spain's overall import/export totals. To
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place them in perspective, exports to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe
actually peaked in 1975, the year of Franco's death, when they accounted
for 3.3 percent of total volume. The same is true of imports from
Comecon nations, which amounted to 2.9 percent of the total in 1975.
In 1979, the latest year for which statistics are available, the export
share was 3.0 percent, while the import share was 2.2 percent. Trade
with the Soviet Union alone, omitting the other Eastern European states,
accounted for less than half of the above totals.
In contrast, trade with the United States accounted for 7.0 percent
of Spanish exports and 12.4 percent of imports in 1979. Trade with
European Economic Community nations accounted for a whopping 48 percent
of exports and 32 percent of imports. Leading purchasers of Spanish
exports were France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom,
and the United States— in that order. The U.S.S.R. ranked 16th, behind
such states as Algeria, Morocco, Venezuela, Switzerland, Japan, Saudi
Arabia, and Argentina. [Ref 17]
Thus, despite Soviet rhetoric, Spain's economic links with Eastern -
Europe remain limited. They account for a very small portion of Spanish
_
trade, with most of the growth since 1975 a result of price inflation
rather than real growth in the volume of goods transferred. Soviet
initiatives to expand the trade relationship have been unsuccessful. -
In several other ways, relations between Spain and the Soviet Union
have not been as smooth as they might have been during the period of
courtship. There have been reports of frequent -and widespread KGB
activity__jLn__Sp_a_1lu Early instances of espionage were related to the
American presence at Rota and Torrejon, but since the United States
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withdrew its nuclear forces from Spanisn bases in 1979, most of the
espionage cnarges have been related to domestic Spanish affairs. The
first two alleged Soviet spies were expelled from the country in 1978.
[Ref. 18] Since that time, several more Soviet diplomats or jovern-
ment employees have been expelled for spying. [Ref. 19]
Of even greater concern to the Spanish were indications ot linKa^e
between tne Soviet Union and various regional separatist movements
within Spain, particularly the terrorist oasque ETA organization,
beginning in 1978, such links were widely reported in botn tne Spanish
and foreign press. According to the Madrid evening newspaper I nforma -
clones
,
"it has been proved that there is a firm connection between
the terrorist organization ETA and the Soviet secret service, tne Kbo".
[Ref. 20] The same paper went on to say that a prominent S^anisn business
leader visiting Moscow had received the following offer: "If you allow
us to use Spain as a springboard to penetrate South America, as well as
decide not to enter .iATO, we will leave you in peace in the aasque
country". [Ref. 21]
One American periodical, the Mew Leader , has ^one so far as to report
a similar offer made on a much higher level:
Most telling of all, though, was the offer Prime Minister
Aleksei Kosygin made early this year to Spain's Foreign Min-
ister Marcel i no Oreja Aguirre. The Kremlin, Kosygin said,
would help 'turn off the terrorists if Spain would pledge
not to join NATO. [Ref. 22]
Other reports have linked the Soviet Canaries fishing fleet with
arms smuggling to the ETA, to tne Urban uRAPO organization, and to tiie
Movement for Autonomy and Independence of the Canary Islands. LR^f. 23]
Several well -documented Western sources nave confirmed that at least
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an indirect Soviet-terrorist link exists, with tne Soviets supporting
terrorist training and providing arms and supplies. The Soviets, of
course, have denied all such allegations.
A turning point in Spanish-Soviet relations was reached following
uromyko's visit to Madrid in 1979. During meetings with Oreja and
Suarez, Gromyko had attempted to persuade the Spanish leaders that NATO —
membership would not be in Spain's best interests. He was firmly
rebuffed. Declaring that Spain was "independent" but not "neutral",
Oreja made it perfectly clear that his country felt itself to De an
integral member of the Western community, bromyko was further embar-
rassed when questions regarding abuse of the Canary Islands fishiny
base and Soviet support for separatist terrorise were publicly raised
by Suarez. [Ref, 24 & 25] The Soviets were politely but firmly told
that Spain would c.ioose its own course, and that advice, however "well-
meaning", would not be received kindly. This visit marks the end of
the courtship period in Spanish-Soviet relations. From this time for-
ward, Soviet initiatives in Spain were directed toward indirect influ-
ence through the political process rather than direct diplomatic
influence of the Madrid government.
The Spanish Government chose to interpret the respite in Soviet
diplomatic initiatives as a sign of Soviet acceptance of Spain's deci-
sion to join the Atlantic Alliance. In an interview with tne Madrid
daily ABC , the current Foreign Minister, Jose Pedro Perez Llorca,
stated that he has observed:
... in the Soviet Union and throughout the East European
socialist camp a calculation in whicn they have reached the
conclusion that they cannot prevent Spain from joining the
Atlantic alliance. [P^ef. 26]
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There is probably at least some truth to this interpretation, for
it is clear that the Soviets were not particularly optimistic about
their ability to influence the UCD government following tne embarrass-
ing failure of the Gromyko mission. But in a larger sense, tiie respite
merely signaled a shift in Soviet tactics rather than an admission of
failure. After 1980, most of the Soviet initiatives were directed at -
weakening popular support for the UCD and promoting the interests of
the PSOE and PCE, both of whom publicly opposed NATO membership for
Spain.
Only one other major appeal by the Soviet Union, directly to the
Spanish Government, has been reported since 1979. On September 7,
1981, Soviet Charge' d' Affaires Ivanov delivered a memorandum to the —
Spanish Foreign Ministry warning Spain of the negative consequences of
its decision to apply for NATO membership. The note was immediately
returned to the Soviet Charge'' after it had been reviewed by the Foreign
Minister and Prime Minister. The Spanish Government accused the Soviet
Union of flagrant interference in the country's internal affairs. A
formal note of protest was later delivered to the Soviet Embassy in
Madrid, in which Spain denied that its accession into NATO represented
any danger to the Soviet Union and was thus a matter of no concern to
the U.S.S.R. [Ref .
_27]
In response to these charges, the Soviets claimed that the enlarge-
ment of the militarist Western Alliance imposed a legitimate obligation
upon the U.S.S.R. to express its position. They claimed that those
who interpreted the memorandum as interference in Spanish internal




interested in casting shadows over trie Spanish-Soviet
relationship. Those pro-Atlantic circles that emphasize the
anti-Soviet campaign are not, after all, interested in the
consolidation of peace and security in Europe and in reducing
the level of tension and military confrontation on our con-
tinent. They are playing the game of the militarist policy
of the present Washington administration. [Ref. 28]
The truth probably lies somewhere in between the two sets of alle-
gations, for the parliamentary debate over the accession was a,jproacning
its peak in Spain at the time. Both the Spanish Government and the
U.S.S.R. sought to gain as much political mileage from the incident as
possible. Support for the UCD's pro-NATO position would be improved
if a sinister motive were ascribed to the Soviet note. On the other
hand, the Soviets surely knew in advance what the reaction of the Calvo-
Sotelo government would be, and countercharges of "militarist sabotage
of detente" were delivered so quickly after the rejection of the note as
to lead one to believe that they might have been prepared in advance.
C. SOVIET PRESSURE ON NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE MEMBERS
Under Article X of the No rth Atlantic Treaty, tne application of
any new member must be unanimously approved by all members . Thus Spain's
membership could be blocked if Soviet initiatives deterred any member
from ratifying the Spanish membership application. Although, according
to Uwe Nerlich, Soviet leverage has yet to influence any decision regard-
ing the fabric of the Western Alliance,
Soviet diplomacy, which first tried to prevent formative
developments within the Atlantic Alliance, was anxious then to
encourage bilateral de'tente efforts of individual Western
countries in order to tear apart the alliance structures.
[Ref. 29]
The concept of detente was the Soviet's basic weapon in the campaign
to influence Alliance members regarding Spanish accession. As early as
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1978, shortly after Spain's move toward the Western European community
became clear, the Soviets began a propaganda campaign designed to dis-
courage support for Spanish membership within the Alliance. Directing
the propaganda pri marily at the ^ortherji^Eujropeans^ to whom detente was
most important, the Soviets proclaimed that Spain's accession would:
. . .
inevitably lead to a rise in the level of confrontation *)(-
between the two European politico-military groupings. This would
act as a stimulus to those who are bent on continuing the policy
of blocs. It would hinder still more the efforts by the European
states to structure their relations on a European basis. [Ref. 30]
In an apparent effort to give substance to the claim that tensions
would inevitably rise, rumors intermittently surfaced that the Soviet
Union might respond to Spanish accession by incorporating Yugoslavia,
Cuba, or Vietnam into the Warsaw Pact. These rumors surfaced most
frequently through the Communist Party offices of other nations, which
was probably a good indication that they lacked substance. They seemed
even less plausible in view of the geo-strategic positions and political
situations of the three countries mentioned. Yet they smack of the
tactics used by Moscow in 1955 when the Warsaw Pact itself was not a
terribly plausible threat. [Refs. 31, 32, 33, & 34]
The Soviets applied both the carrot and the stick to the Western
Europeans. Even as they were obliquely threatening to expand their own
alliance they were also continuing to push the resolution previously
pre^^njteA^aXJJmJielsjjklJIoJiference in 1 9.Z5_jto^roMMt_gjcp^ns^ion of
both NATO and the WarsawJYeaty Organi zation. This measure, formally
endorsed by the Warsaw Pact Political Advisory Committee [Ref. 35], was
again pressed by the Soviets at the Madrid Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. [Ref. 36]
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In but one case, that of the Federal Republic of Germany, did the
Soviets single out a particular nation for attention in this campaign.
The Soviets regarded the Germans as co-conspirators, along with the
United States, in pushing NATO membership upon the Spanish. They went
so far as to suggest that German support for Spanish membership was
based upon the interests of a small group of Bundeswehr generals and
military industrialists who saw Spanish membership in NATO as furthering
their private interests in Spain. [Ref. 37] The Soviets used such
allegations in an attempt to weaken German domestic support for Spanish
accession. They also applied pressure directly on the Social Democratic
government of the Federal Republic. The Times reported that, during his
visit to Moscow in 1980, Chancellor Schmidt was warned by Soviet Presi-
dent Brezhnev to drop his support for Spanish accession. [Ref. 38]
Although ratification of the Spanish membership application is still
not complete, it does not appear that the Soviet initiatives have been
at all successful. Secretary General Luns announced as early as .-lay 1981,
only weeks after Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo had declared his government's
decision to accelerate Spain's move toward .NATO membership, that all
member nations of the alliance had promised their support for accession.
[Ref. 39] The ratification process is apparently proceeding without
serious opposition.
Greek opposition, briefly voiced at the December 1981 meeting of the
North Atlantic Council, was publicly justified on the basis of solidarity
with Spani sh Socialists rather than agreement with Soviet arguments.
The Greek position was probably no more than an exercise in muscle flex-
ing by President Papandreou, who was in the process of renegotiating
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his country's position in NATO at the time the Spanish application was
being discussed. When the actual vote was taken on December 10, Greece
quietly voted with the other Alliance members in favor of extending an
invitation to Spain,
In Germany, the voice of former Chancellor Brandt has been nearly
alone in crying the dangers to detente of Spanish accession. The posi-
tion of the Brandt element of the SPD is consistent with their traditional
position of supporting detente at nearly any cost. The government of the
Federal Republic remains firmly committed to supporting Spanish accession.
Canada and the United Kingdom have already completed ratification of
the accession protocol, while the other Alliance members hope to complete
the ratification process prior to the May meeting of the Defense Planning
Committee. The only delay which can be envisioned at this point would be
related to procedural requirements in one or possibly two of the Central
European states.
D. SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROCESS IN SPAIN
The Soviet Union began an anti-NATO propaganda campaign in Spain as
early as 1978. The arguments used at the height of the propaganda
campaign in September 1981 were essentially refinements of the arguments
originally presented in 1978, although the emphasis had shifted from
persuasion to coercion. Virtually all Soviet presentations on the subject
of accession repeated the same basic themes.
Initially, the strongest thrust of Soviet propaganda was an appeal
to Spanish pride. In this context, the Soviets accused the UCD govern-
ment of succumbing to pressure from the United States . rather than
first considering the interests of the Spanish people. It was claimed
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that the U.S. was anxious to expand its forces in Spain under the NATO
mandate, making Spain in particular a forward base for the Rapid Deploy-
ment Force. It also was claimed that once Spain was in NATO, the U.S.
would pressure the government to accept the return of nuclear weapons
to Spanish soil
.
The Soviets argued that Spain should play a role "worthy" of its
world position, and this meant that it must pursue an independent
foreign policy rather than subscribe to the dictates of the United
States and the Atlantic bloc, Spanish citizens were told that their
prestige and influence would suffer globally should the nation associate
itself with the Atlantic Alliance:
Practice shows that the countries which do not accept blocs
[
and apply an independent foreign policy exercise much greater
influence on the course of international affairs than the
countries which are dragged into military blocs. [Ref. 40]
J
The Soviets argued that membership in the Alliance would reduce
Spanish prestige in Latin America, an area which was concerned by American
attempts to exercise regional hegemony. Spanish prestige also would be
reduced in North Africa, particularly if the Canary Islands (which lie
off the coast of Morocco) were opened up to NATO military facilities.
The Soviets pointed out that Edem Kodjo, Secretary General of the Organ-
ization of African Unity, had expressed OAU concern for the destabilizing
effects of a NATO military base in the Canaries. [Ref. 41]
On the other hand, the positive benefits of a nonaligned policy or
closer association with the world's Socialist nations were heralded.
The arguments on this theme paralleled those already discussed in the
section on direct diplomatic relations. To the UCD assertion that NATO
accession was merely one more step toward the assumption by Spain of an
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influential place in the Western community, the Soviets retorted that
NATO membership was not a precondition for membership in the Western
community. Attempting to weaken the linkage between NATO and the Western
community of nations, the Soviets pointed out that Austria, Ireland,
Sweden, and Switzerland were all "undoubtedly" members of the Western
community but not NATO members. Further, it was pointed out, these nations
were free of the "straight-jacket of bloc discipline" which restricted
their freedom to develop relations with neighbors in Eastern Europe. [Ref.
42] A synthesis of these arguments could lead only to the conclusion,
the Soviets asserted, that Spain's international prestige and national
interests would best be served by pursuing an independent policy not
associated with either bloc.
Soviet propaganda also questioned the economic burden of NATO member-
ship for the Spanish people. Only the highest cost estimates were cited,
and Spanish references were normally given for the figures used. The
most frequently quoted source was the daily El Pais , which has opposed
Spain's association with NATO. The cost estimates were inflated by
attributing all current Spanish defense budget increases to the cost of
NATO membership, and by hypothesizing that all benefits from the U.S.-
Spanish base rights agreements would be lost should Spain join NATO.
The Soviet broadcasts did not bother to explain that the government
was committed to modernizing the nation's Armed Forces regardless of
whether Spain joined the Alliance; nor did they bother to explain that
most of the "benefits" of the base rights agreement were in the form
of loan guarantees rather than grants. At a time when the Spanish
economy was troubled by rising energy costs and falling revenue from
tourism, the economic cost arguments created serious concern among the
Spanish people. 35

Just prior to the opening of the Conference on Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe in Madrid (and shortly after Gromyko's ill-fated visit
to Madrid), Soviet rhetoric turned from rational, if biased, reasoning
to open threat. In a January 26, 1980 broadcast, Radio Moscow asserted
to the Spanish People that Spain's entry into NATO was viewed as "the
principal obstacle on the road to de'tente ... the realization of which
so vitally concerns the people of Europe". Furthermore, the broadcast
continued, Washington had forced on Brussels a program to install new
nuclear missiles in Europe, the effect of which "could turn West Europe
into the hostage and future victim" of a nuclear conflict. [Ref. 43]
President Brezhnev's pledge that the Soviet Union would not use
nuclear weapons against any state which did not own or accept nuclear
weapons on its soil was repeated frequently. \ Simultaneously, the Soviets
questioned whether the UCD government, if it bowed to U.S. pressure for
NATO accession, could be expected to resist inevitable U.S. pressure to
once again accept the deployment of nuclear weapons in Spain. The
Soviets attempted to convince the Spanish that rather than enhancing
Spain's security, membership in the Atlantic Alliance actually would
weaken it.
Finally, the Soviets argued that NATO membership would weaken rather
than strengthen democracy in Spain. They declared that NATO had an anti-
democratic tradition, citing the admission of Portugal under Salazar,
and later the acceptance of the "Colonel's Regime" in Greece and the
Caetano government in Portugal as evidence to support the thesis. The
real reason why the U.S. and its allies wanted Spain in NATO, they
argued, was that they were concerned with the increasing activity of
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the democratic forces in Spain—forces which the Soviet Union saw as
supporting neutrality. Washington's goal, it was alleged, was to
expand its influence over Spanish politics and prevent the democrati-
zation process fj?ojn_grolngrJ!iaojfjj^\_[Ref. 44]
Within Spain, reaction to Soviet propaganda varied in each of the
major political parties. The strongest reaction has come from the
Union del Centro Democrat!* ca, the government majority party. The UCD
has tried with some success to turn the Soviet propaganda back against
the U.S.S.R., attempting to create a popular backlash against Soviet
interference. The incidents of alleged KGB activity and the expulsion
of Soviet diplomats from Spain have received wide coverage in the.
government-controlled broadcast media, as did the diplomatic note from
Moscow in September 1981. Members of the opposition party have accused
the Calvo-Sotelo government of "creating" an incident with the Soviet
Union in order to forward their own position as advocates of NATO.
Said Fernando Moran, the PSOE's ranking representative on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee:
As for the handing over of the note, I must say that the
problem posed by the incident lies in the publicizing of it.
I believe that if Yugoslavia decided to join the Warsaw Pact,
the United States would inform Belgrade of the consequences
which, in its i pinion, that would have. Who publicized the
note? The government with its protest? The TASS news agency?
This is a priority issue to be debated. [Ref. 45J
A clash of major proportions erupted in August 1981 between the PSOE
and elements of the UCD concerning Soviet influence on the NATO decision,
Unidentified sources within the UCD leaked to the Spanish press allega-
tions of a "deal" between the PSOE and the Soviet Union on the NATO
question. According to the allegations, the PSOE had agreed to oppose
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Spain's membership in NATO in return for Soviet aid in securing power in
the Spanish Government. The allegations were widely publicized in the
Spanish press.
The leadership of the PSOE vehemently denied the existence of any
such agreement and demanded a retraction from the government. Prime
Minister Calvo-Sotelo, in a public press conference, admitted that his
party had acted thoughtlessly in releasing the allegations. He declared
that publication of the allegations represented an indiscretion, and
stated he did not believe that "a secret agreement with the CPSU can
seriously be attributed to the PSOE". [Ref. 46]
The political clash had come at an unfortunate time for the Prime
Minister, for it threatened to wreck recently-reached agreements between
the UCD and PSOE concerning trade union management and a formula for
regional autonomy. The agreements were very important to the stability
of the new government, and their collapse could have precipitated a
crisis within the UCD. [Ref. 47] Yet the likelihood remains that the
allegations were leaked, perhaps with the Prime Minister's approval or
perhaps not, as a concious attempt to discredit PSOE opposition to NATO.
That the other political liabilities spawned by the disclosure were not
recognized is perhaps a result of certain party members' inexperience
with the process of democracy.
For its part, the PSOE has been ambivalent about Soviet influence.
While it publicly rejects Soviet interference in Spanish politics,
PSOE spokesmen acknowledge that Soviet interests will be affected by
the accession question, as will those of the United States. They claim
that both nations are equally guilty of pressuring Spain regarding the
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debate. Regarding the diplomatic note of September 1981, a PSOE
spokesman said:
As a party, we reject any interference by the U.S.S.R. in
internal affairs. As for the contents of the U.S.S.R. 's docu-
ment, three aspects of it must be highlighted: First, it states
that entry into NATO is an issue to be decided on by the Spanish
people, which is positive and an advance in Soviet stances;
second, it emphasizes the harmful effect of this entry on
de'tente; and there is a third part, with veiled threats against
Spain, which is totally unacceptable. [Ref. 48]
To support the thesis that U.S. pressure in favor of accession is
just as great as Soviet pressure against the issue, the PSOE produced
documents allegedly showing that the journal in which the CPSU-PSOE
agreement story had been first published, the Carta del Este , was
financed by the American CIA. [Ref. 49]
The PSOE position has been based on a policy of opposition to
association with either bloc. The PSOE has been sympathetic to Soviet
suggestions that association with NATO will restrict Spain's free con-
duct of foreign relations and subject it to external pressure from the
stronger members of the alliance, particularly the United States. But
the position appears to have been arrived at independently rather than
as a result of Soviet influence. The PSOE favored a public referendum
on the NATO question rather than a parliamentary vote, but it agreed
publicly that it would abide by the results of such a referendum whether
favorable or not. As the outcome of the parliamentary debates con-
cerning accession became less doubtful, the PSOE softened its stance on
"iThere is not much doubt that such a referendum would have resulted
in defeat of the NATO proposal. A poll published in July by the Madrid
newspaper Diario 16 showed that only 36 percent of Spaniards favored
accession while 43 percent were opposed. Other polls had shown even
less support for accession.
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the long term question of NATO membership. Previously the party had
declared that, should it win power in a subsequent election, it would
vote Spain back out of NATO through parliamentary action just as the
UCD had voted it in. Now the party merely says that it will reopen
debate on the issue. [Ref. 50] Further, PSOE support for renewal of
the U.S. base rights treaty indicates that the party does in fact view
the Soviet Union as the greater security threat to Spain.
The position of the PCE has been quite close to that of the PSOE.
Says Sr. Santiago Carrillo, the leader of the Spanish Communist Party:
Some people have tried to identify our position with that
of
. , . the Soviet Union. However, I should like to say that
our position has nothing to do with the position of the Soviet
Union. We said at our congress that the class struggle in the
international area is not waged through the confrontation
between the two blocs existing in the world today but rather
through their abolition. [Ref. 51]
Like the PSOE, the PCE has agreed with government rejection of Soviet
interference in Spain's internal affairs. But, adds Santiago Carrillo:
. . .
why does Calvo-Sotelo's government not show the same
self-respect in connection with the continuous U.S. inter-
ference in Spanish politics? Why does Calvo-Sotelo humble
himself? [Ref. 52]
Given Santiago Carrillo's unique and independent brand of Euro-Communism,
which dates from prior to the 1976 Berlin Communist Party Conference, it
is unlikely that he is being less than truthful with such shetoric. The
PCE, like the PSOE, agrees with some of the points made in Soviet anti-
NATO propaganda. But each of the parties has reached its viewpoint
independently, and neither has been influenced strongly by the Soviet
Union. 2
2 In addition to those articles cited in Ref. 51 and 52, a comprehen-




Soviet efforts to influence events leading up to Spanish accession
into NATO have not been effective. The European community has been
indifferent to Soviet protestations concerning changes in the balance
of power in Europe and the end of detente. The Soviet cause certainly
has not been strengthened in this regard by a general deterioration
of de'tente surrounding the events in Afghanistan and Poland which have
proceeded concurrently with the Spanish accession process. In dealing
with the government of Spain, since 1978 the Soviet Union actually has
created additional animosity between the two states, and its sometimes
brash attempts to influence Spanish policy have provided the UCO with
additional arguments to support acceleration of the accession process.
Although certain of the propaganda arguments presented in Soviet press
and broadcasts have been repeated by Spain's opposition parties,
there is no reason to believe that Soviet propaganda has been instru-
mental in shaping the positions of the PSOE or the PCE on the NATO issue.
However, on at least one issue the Soviets can claim victory. How
much their propaganda had to do with the victory is uncertain, for the
attentive Spanish public became concerned about the question of American
nuclear weapons in Europe at about the same time as other Europeans.
2 Cont. Medvedenkcu "Drawing Spain Into NATO," New Times , Moscow, No.
26:78, June 1978, pp. 22-3; Radio Moscow Broadcast in Spanish, Mikhail
Kremnev, Commentator, 2 April 1979 (from FBIS : U.S.S.R. Edition, 4 April
1979, pp. G7-8; Radio Moscow Broadcast in Spanish, Aleksey Georgiyev,
Commentator, 26 January 1980 (from FBIS : U.S.S.R. Edition, 28 January
1980, pp. 33-4); *CPSU Publishes Greetings to PCE Congress," Pravda, 28
July 1981, p. 1 (from FBIS : U.S.S.R. Edition, 3 August 1981, P. Gl )
;
Radio Moscow Broadcast in Spanish, August 24, 1981 (from ( FBIS : U.S.S.R.
Edition, 26 August 1981, pp. Gl-2).
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Soviet threats and propaganda probably had as muc h to do with popular-
izi ng theji ssue in Spain as well as elsewhere in Europe. Precisely
how much influence that was is uncertain. But whatever the degree of
influence, concern for the issue in Spain has led to government agree-
ment to keep Spain a nuclear-free zone whether or not the country
enters NATO.
The writing was on the wall in 1975-76, during negotiations for the
renewal of U.S. base access in Spain. The Spanish demanded at the time,
and the U.S. conceded, that all nuclear weapons be removed from the naval
and air bases. The government now has officially stated that under no
circumstances will nuclear weapons be deployed to or stored in Spain in
the future. [Ref. 53] The significance of this victory is limited,
since U.S. ballistic missile submarines and strategic air forces already
have been removed under the provisions of the 1976 bilateral treaty.
Still, Spanish rejection of the weapons reinforces the current trend
within NATO toward the renunciation of a theater nuclear deterrent.
There is still one way in which Soviet influence could affect the
final outcome of the accession process. Soviet support for Spain's
various regional separatist movements could escalate the conflict between
the government and the terrorists. The debate concerning regional
autonomy was one of the issues which precipitated the fall of the
Spanish Republic in 1939. The formulation of a policy for dealing with
the autonomy question is one of the major problems facing the UCD
government today.
A crisis was narrowly averted during the past summer when allega-
tions of the CPSU-PSOE "deal" nearly wrecked autonomy formula agreements
with the minority party. The discontent of the conser/ative right over
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"soft treatment" of separatist terrorists by the government was an
immediate cause of the February 1981 coup attempt in Madrid.
The UCD government has embarked on its accelerated quest for NATO
membership as a way to get the Army out of domestic politics. But
should terrorist activity, possibly with Soviet backing, accelerate in
spite of the government's autonomy concessions, it is possible that
either the conservative right or the Social Democratic element of the
UCD could withdraw its support for NATO membership before accession is
ratified by all Alliance members. An even worse possibility is that
escalated terrorism could lead to another coup attempt by the right
before accession is complete. A return to dictatorial government would
surely result in the veto of Spanish accession by liberal Northern
European states; even if unsuccessful, another coup attempt might result
in one or more of those states demanding that the Spanish Government
demonstrate greater stability before the protocol of accession is
ratified. Fortunately, at the time of this writing, chances of such an
eventuality are slim, but the possibility still exists that the
accession process may fail.
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III. ANGLO-SPANISH RELATIONS: THE GIBRALTAR QUESTION
A. OVERVIEW
Article Ten of the Treaty of Utrecht, signed in 1713, oegins as
follows:
The Catholic King (of Spain) does hereby, for himself, his
heirs and successors, yield to the Crown of Great Britain the
full and entire propriety of the town and castle of Gibraltar,
together with tiie port, fortifications, and forts thereunto
belonging; and he gives up the said propriety to be held and
enjoyed absolutely with all manner of right for ever, without
any exception and impediment whatsoever. [Ref. 54]
Thus did Spain acknowledge England's conquest and occupation of Gibraltar
during the War of the Spanish Succession; and thus, apparently, was the
right of sovereignty over that strategic bit of real estate passed for-
ever to Great Britain. Yet since 1954 the issue of sovereignty over
Gibraltar has reemerged with renewed vigor, threatening in recent years
to stall Spain's entry into NATO and the European Economic Community.
It is surprising that this apparently anachronistic dispute should
have resurfaced inasmuch as Britain was one of the first nations to join
the United States in expanding relations with Spain following World War II,
and nas nominally been one of Spain's most consistent supporters in that
nation's efforts to enter the mainstream of the community of Western
European nations. It is doubly surprising that Spain continues to press
its claim to sovereignty in spite of the fact that 3ritain is in a posi-
tion to block her entry into NATO, a setback which the moderate Spanish
UCD government could hardly tolerate in its politically vulnerable posi-
tion.
The Gibraltar issue is, in fact, far from an anachronism, a lively






significant interests, and one which is far from final resolution. In
spite of both nation's commitment to resolving the issue concurrently
with the accession of Spain into NATO, it is likely that a permanent
solution which satisfies all parties will not be forthcoming in the near
future, and that the issue will remain as a source of friction within
the Alliance in the future.
3. THE EMERGENCE OF THE PROBLEM
1. The Spanish Position
The Spanish claim they have continuously challenged Britain's
claim of sovereignty since the capture of Gibraltar by Admiral Sir George
Rooke in 1704. In the selection of the word "continuously", the Spanish
exaggerate somewhat, for the third and last military challenge to 3ritish
possession came in 1783. Following that year's failure of the so-called
"Great Siege" to dislodge the English from the fortress, the issue was not
seriously raised again until 1954 when it was renewed by the Franco
government. Only briefly, in the late 1800' s, was the issue officially
broached during this 170 year interlude. Spain was too busy trying to
resolve the pressing problems of domestic instability and its own crumb-
ling empire to challenge the power of Great Britain.
During the Napoleonic Wars and World War II, Gibraltar was
threatened by third powers, but in each case Spain proved unwilling or
unable to aid the enemy in dislodging Britain from the fortress. In the
Second World War, Franco not only refused Hitler permission to send
troops through Spain to attack Gibraltar, but allowed Britain to proceed
unchallenged with the construction of an airfield on the low ground
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between Gibraltar and S^ain, land which had previously been a neutral
"no-man's-land" between tne Spanish and English fortifications.
A changing relationship between Spain and Britain allowed Franco
to renew the Spanish claim to Gibraltar in 1954. Stabilization of tne
Spanish Government, and recovery from the trauma of the Civil Aar had
proceeded, although slowly, over a 15-year period. In 1954, Spain's
central government was secure and its economy was snowing signs of
positive growth for the first time in years. Spain's position of isola-
tion in the world community was softening, as evidenced by a Treaty of
Friendship concluded witi the United States in 1953, and her admission
to the United 'lations in 1954. More importantly, the position of Great
3ritain was seriously eroded by economic and social proolems precipitated
by the war, and by global pressure for an end to colonialism. The global
anti-colonial movement, which had its forum in tne United Nations, offered
Franco a favoraole environment to renew Spain's claim to Gibraltar.
Franco's motives for renewing his claim at this time were probably
four-fold. Economically, Gibraltar was both boon and bane to Spain. In
the early 1950's, as many as 13,000 Spaniards daily crossed the line to
work in the shipyards, shops, and homes of Gibraltar. The income from
these jobs provided a basis for the economies of the nearby Spanish towns
of La Linea and San Roque, and formed a significant part of Spain's
then-small hard currency income. But, Gibraltar was infested also with
smugglers, many of whom became rich circumventing the high Spanish import
duties by running tobacco and consumer goods in small motor launches
up the Spanisn coast from Gibraltar. In 1961, for example, dritisn
figures show that Gibraltar imported 841 million American cigarettes in
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one six-month period. That amounts to about 40,000 cigarettes, or
2,000 packs of cigarettes, for each man, woman, and child in the colony.
Obviously, most of those cigarettes were not consumed by Gibraltarians.
The high volume of smuggling from Gibraltar dearly cost the Spanish
Government lost tariff revenues, and Spain claimed that dumping of
Spanish currency by smugglers on the monetary exchanges of Zurich was
having a destabilizing effect on the value of the paseta. [Ref. 55]
Politically, since WWII Franco had been concerned with the rise
of liberal, democratic ideas among the Gibraltarians. The years since
the war had seen the rapid growth of trade unions, and the emergence of
the colony's first political party— the Association for the Advancement
of Civil Rights, The colonials had demanded and secured a measure of
representation in the legislative council, the government machinery of
the colony. There was agitation for full internal autonomy. Such ideas
were intolerable in Falangist Spain, yet large numbers of Spaniards
were engaged in daily commerce with the Spanish-speaking residents of
Gibraltar where these ideas were flourishing. It was important that
the discipline and tranquility of neighboring Andalusia not be under-
mined by the spread of liberal thought from Gibraltar.
Finally, Gibraltar offended the sensitive Spanish temperament
in two further ways. First there was personal insult. Spanish guest
workers in Gibraltar were treated as second-class persons by both the
British and the Gibraltarians. They held only the tough, manual labor
jobs in construction, the trades, and domestic service which neither
of the other groups would accept, and they were paid lower wages than
the permanent residents (though significantly higher wages than they
might receive for the same work in Spain).
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They were discriminated against in other ways, such as being
subjected to identification checks as they entered each morning, being
required to carry official passes at all times, and being forbidden to
remain in the town overnight. Although the evidence indicates that
most Spaniards who worked in Gibraltar were perfectly happy to endure
such discrimination in exchange for the opportunity for a good job, it
is totally in character for other Spaniards to take personal affront at
the shabby treatment of their countrymen by the foreigners in Gibraltar,
[Refs. 56 & 57]
A second and more important offense was the perception of
national insult which the presence of British Gibraltar caused among
Spaniards. Demonstrating this situation through allegory to a British
friend, a Spanish lawyer proposed the following: In exchange for Gib-
raltar, the Spanish would receive a certain rocky promontory near Dover
to do with as they pleased. On that promontory they would build a
naval base and a fort, whose guns would point at the mainland, as did
those of Gibraltar. Residents of the promontory would observe Spanish
law and custom, to include tolerance of homosexuality and death by
garroting in case of capital offenses. The promontory would be a free
port, into which all goods could flow free of duty; Spain, however,
would not concern itself with the disposition of these goods, and
possibly some of them could slip into England without being taxed.
There would be a bullfight every Sunday, and an open gambling casino.
English workers, entering as commuters, would be paid Spanish wages
and be subject to Spanish trade union laws. In the event of war,
England would not have the right to use the facilities of the
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promontory for her own defense, but would have to respect the right of
Spain to declare the neutrality or combatant status of the territory.
Should it be captured by an enemy of Spain, England could not use this
as a pretext to enter the promontory and reassert her claim. And,
finally, should Spain decide to cede the promontory to another state
or to grant it sovereignty unto itself, England would have to accept
whatever disposition Spain selected without recourse. [Ref. 58] This
comparison, although it has legal shortcomings, nonetheless clearly
illustrates the emotional issues involved for Spain.
2. The British Position
The British response to Spain's renewed claim of sovereignty
was, of course, negative. British pride and tradition were as deeply
tied to Gibraltar as was Spanish pride. Since the successful defense
of the Rock against the Great Siege of 1779-1783, the strength and health
of England and the Empire had been linked symbolically to Gibraltar.
"Steady as the Rock" had real meaning to many in England. A more prag-
matic reason for clinging to Gibraltar was the strategic value of the
place which, though no longer as great as it had been in the days of
sail, was still significant. In 1954, Britain had not yet removed
itself from "East of Suez", and its interests in the Mediterranean were
significant.
There also were more noble reasons for rebuffing the Spanish,
the most important of which was genuine support for democratic tradi-
tions. Spain was under the Fascist hand of Franco even while the
Gibraltarians were moving toward democracy in their own way. Even
Englishmen of short memory had not forgotten that in WWII, only a decade
past at this time, the Gibraltarians had stood up for Britain when days
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were darkest for the Allies, and it appeared that Franco might give
Hitler leave to move through Spain and attack Gibraltar. [Ref, 59]
Britain could not, and would not, abandon such loyal and unwilling
subjects to a Fascist military dictatorship. The subjects certainly
were unwilling, for it has often been said of the Gibraltarians that
they consider themselves Mmore British than the British". [Refs. 60
& 61] As long as the residents of the Rock were opposed to Spanish
sovereignty, British surrender of Gibraltar to Franco was unthinkable.
Britain based its defense against the Spanish charge of colonialism
on international law, citing the Treaty of Utrecht and the subsequent
affirmations of British possession contained in the treaties of 1763
and 1783. [Ref. 62]
3. The Gibraltarian Position
The people of Gibraltar are of unique heritage. Their only
association with Spain is through language: Spanish forms the basis
of the language of family life on Gibraltar. However, there is almost
no literature in the Spanish tongue. English is the formal language
of business, government, and education. All commerce and writing are,
by choice, in English. Culturally the Gibraltarian has his roots in
England, which has controlled his home since his family first arrived.
The original Spanish population of Gibraltar was evacuated
from the peninsula when it was captured by Rooke in 1704. Only about
100 civilians remained, these being mostly Genoese fishermen and a
few Jews. The only Spaniards who remained were those invalids too ill
to move, and one priest who refused to leave his church in the hands
of the Anglican heretics.
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Thus today, the population of Gibraltar has few cultural or
blood ties with Spain, but is rather the product of immigrant parentage.
The largest percentage of today's residents trace their heritage back
to northern Italy, with smaller proportions of Portuguese, Irish,
Jewish, Moorish, and Maltese ancestry. There is a significant minority
of people with Spanish blood, but these are either the offspring of
mixed marriages between Gibral tarians and local Spaniards, or the
decendents of Spanish political refugees from the 19th century. [Ref. 63]
Essentially there were four reasons why the Gibral tarians
strongly opposed Spanish claims to sovereignty over their home. The
first was their English heritage and identity, which they feared they
would lose if absorbed by Spain. The second was the economic advantage
which they enjoyed under British rule. They had low taxes, received
subsidies from Britain, and benefitted from British wages in the ship-
yards, port, and peripheral trades which supported the British military
presence. Not insignificant in 1954 were the profits which many Gib-
ral tarians shared from illegal commerce with Spain. [Ref. 64] The third
reason was the democratic freedom they enjoyed under Britain which would
have been forfeited had they fallen under Franco's rule. The final
reason was that, like the Spanish and the British, the Gibral tarian
pride had been offended in the dispute. They had been insulted by
the Spanish, who regarded them as a temporary and fabricated population.
[Refs. 65 & 66]
4. The Legal Questions
Had the legal issues of sovereignty been as clear-cut as the
first paragraph of Article Ten of the Treaty of Utrecht appears to make
them, then in all likelihood the Spanish claim would have been
52

dismissed quickly, even in the favorable environment outlined above.
But the remaining provisions of the Article introduce enough ambiguity
into the meaning of the first paragraph to invite further scrutiny of
the entire question. This has proven most unfortunate for the British
and Gibral tarians.
The greatest degree of uncertainty revolves around the second
paragraph of Article Ten, which states that:
... the Catholic King wills, and takes it to be understood
that the above-named propriety be yielded to Great Britain with-
out any territorial jurisdiction, and without any open communi-
cation by land with the country roundabout. [Ref. 67]
What does the phrase "without territorial jurisdiction" mean?
The British maintain that it means without jurisdiction over the country
roundabout. Some maintain that it means without jurisdiction over
adjacent waters (or airspace) which normally would accrue with sover-
eignty. The Spanish maintain that it supports their contention that
Spain yielded only the rights to the fortification (in effect, base
rights) without yielding its claim to sovereign jurisdiction over all
of Gibraltar. The phrase concerning land communications, which the
Spanish have used to justify the subsequent closing of the land border,
also has been subject to various interpretations.
At various times, Spain has claimed that the entire Article Ten
has been rendered void by unilateral British actions which violated the
provisions of the treaty. These provisions are the agreements which
state that Britain will allow neither Jews nor Moors to reside in
Gibraltar, and that, should Britain ever choose to alienate itself
from the propriety, "the preference of having the same shall always
be given to the Crown of Spain before any others". The first objection
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is clearly technical, and one which Spain has not vigorously pursued
for obvious reasons. However, Spain invokes the second clause to
prohibit the transfer of autonomy to the Gibraltarians, thus prevent-
ing the British from freeing themselves from the problem by granting
independence to the colony.
Some Britons argue that Gibraltar is effectively British by
right of conquest which predates the Treaty of Utrecht. However, the
Spanish effectively counter this argument by pointing out that when
Admiral Rooke captured Gibraltar in 1704, he did so with an allied fleet
of English and Dutch warships acting on behalf of the Hapsburg pre-
tender to the throne of Spain, Charles of Austria. Furthermore, Rooke'
s
expedition was under the political command of the Prince of Hesse-
Darmstadt, acting as Charles' agent, who subsequently appointed the
Count of Valdesoto as the first Governor of Gibraltar. Spain maintains
that Gibraltar was captured by, and for, a Spaniard.
The uncertainty introduced by the various interpretations of
these clauses and events provided the opening which the Franco govern-
ment needed to introduce its claims before the United Nations in 1956. J
C, CLOSING THE GATES
By 1954, both the motives and the favorable environment for reasser-
tion of Spanish claims to Gibraltar had been established. All that
remained was for a catalyst to spark the debate. The announcement by
3
Fawcett's article [Ref. 54] contains a full and lucid discussion
of the legal questions argued from the British perspective. For a
discussion of the arguments from a Spanish perspective, see Stewart
[Ref. 55], Chapter 27.
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Britain in early April that the Queen would visit Gibraltar provided
that spark, and Franco decided to seize the opportunity to renew the
conflict with Britain. Claiming that the sole purpose of the Queen's
visit was to embarrass Spain and to reassert British sovereignty over
the colony, the indignant Spanish Government condemned Britain because
it had not been consulted before the visit was announced. The issues
of discrimination against Spanish workers and smuggling were trotted
out to justify Spanish concerns. [Ref. 68]
In reprisal for the visit, Spain announced plans to close the Con-
sulate in Gibraltar permanently on May 1, to seal the border on May 10
and 11 during the Queen's visit, and implied that it could not guarantee
the safety of the royal family during their stay in Gibraltar. [Ref. 69]
It seems highly unlikely that there was any substance to the implication.
Nonetheless, whether in retaliation or in genuine concern for the Queen's
safety, early in May Britain responded by commencing security checks of
all incoming Spanish laborers. The security checks resulted in delays
of up to two hours for laborers entering Gibraltar on foot from Spain,
Although the greatest effect of the checks was the disruption of Gibral-
tar's economy, Spain interpreted them as an intentional insult. [Ref. 70]
The Spanish response was to begin delaying automobile traffic departing
Gibraltar by requiring thorough searches of each vehicle. [Ref. 71]
The controversy did not resubmerge following the Queen's visit.
Although the border was reopened, the vehicle searches continued. The
Spanish Government ceased issuing work permits for Spanish laborers to
enter Gibraltar and began requiring visas for persons entering Spain
from Gibraltar on British passports. The threat implied in the first
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action was that Spain eventually would choke off the supply of labor
upon which Gibraltar's economy depended. The Franco government could
not do this all at once, for the income of these laborers made a
significant contribution to Spanish hard currency income, and there
were no jobs available in Spain to replace those lost on the Rock.
By denying applications for new work permits, over a period of years
Spain gradually could reduce the dependency of the neighboring economy
on Gibraltar's industries, and develop other sources of foreign exchange.
The second action was purely a gesture of harassment. For, since
the Consulate in Gibraltar was not closed, a visa could be obtained only
by traveling in person from Gibraltar to London to make application.
[Ref. 72] A diplomatic war of words between London and Madrid followed,
with the Spanish Government reasserting an old claim that the Churchill
government had promised to cede Gibraltar to Spain in return for Spanish
neutrality in World War II. [Ref. 73]
In 1956 Spain presented its claim for sovereignty before the United
Nations General Assembly. It was not until 1963, however, that the UN
Special Committee on the Situation With Regard To the Implementation of
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples (hereafter gratefully referred to as the "Committee of the
24") actively began to consider Spain's claims. Spanish concern by
this time was heightened by on-going negotiations for additional autonomy
for Gibraltar.
In July 1964, Gibraltar received its first constitution, which forms
the basis of the constitution in force today. The constitution provided
for internal self-government through a Legislative Council composed of
11 elected members, and two members appointed by the Governor (who was
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himself still an appointee of the Queen). The nominal head of govern-
ment would be the Chief Minister, selected by the Legislative Council from
among its elected members. [Ref. 74] The new constitution was immediately
attacked by Spain as a British ploy to defuse the decolonization issue.
The first government under the new constitution assumed office on 10
September 1965, and Chief Minister Joshua Hassan found his first duty to
be the defense of his position before the Committee of the 24 which was
considering the Gibraltar question at Spain's urgent request. At the
United Nations, Hassan and Peter Isola, the head of the opposition party
in Gibraltar, succeeded in convincing the UN Committee that Gibraltar
was, in fact, moving toward a genuinely noncolonial position. As a result
of their successful presentation in New York, the recommendation of the
Committee did not condemn Britain, but limited itself to calling for joint
negotiations to resolve the dispute—a measure far less than Spain had
demanded.
Following the 1965 Committee of the 24 resolution, Britain's initial
position was that it would not meet with the Spanish while the border
restrictions were in effect, and that it was willing to "discuss" the
situation but would not "negotiate" the question of sovereignty.
"Negotiation" implied a willingness to accept something less than full
sovereignty. But under constant pressure of world opinion, and with a
genuine belief that its position was justified, Britain dropped the
semantic debate and agreed to meet with Spain in a first round of talks
in May 1966. The talks collapsed in the autumn with the two sides still
far apart. The immediate cause of the collapse was the emergence of a
new subissue concerning sovereignty over Gibraltar's airfield which had
been built in the traditional "no-man's-land" between the Rock and the
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mainland. It was clear, however, that the talks were not going any-
where anyway, Spain's best offer in exchange for sovereignty over the
peninsula had been a long term agreement for continued British military
use of the port and airfield, and recognition of the resident's "special
relationship" with the United Kingdom. Britain was willing to give
Spain control of the port and dockyard, and to establish joint arrange-
ments for controlling smuggling. Under no circumstances was it willing
to concede sovereignty to the Franco government. In October and November,
Spain's immediate response to the collapse was the application of the
additional restrictions.
In addition to the curtailment of new work passes, Spain already had
forbidden British citizens of Gibraltar to maintain residences in Spain,
and had begun requiring special passes for vehicles entering Gibraltar
from Spain. The airfield dispute led to new Spanish restrictions prohibit-
ing British aircraft from overflying Spanish territory during takeoff or
landing approach. Eventually a prohibited zone for commercial aircraft
was established east and west of Gibraltar, and overflight of any part of
Spain by British military aircraft was banned. [Ref. 75]
The year 1966 ended with a minor British diplomatic victory. Con-
sidering the resolution prepared the previous year by the Committee of
the 24, the UN General Assembly accepted an amendment from Sierra Leone
which required that Spain and Britain consider the desires of the people
of Gibraltar in their negotiations over the future of the colony. [Refs.
76 & 77]
The two nations did not meet at the negotiating table in 1967. The
"siege" of Gibraltar was tightened still further by the prohibition of
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bicycles at the border crossing, and by a ban prohibiting Spanish women
from working in Gibraltar (presumably to spare them from being forced
to do demeaning domestic work). [Ref. 78] In June, Britain announced
its intention to conduct a referendum on self-determination in Gibraltar,
at which time the Spanish invoked the clause in the Treaty of Utrecht which
prohibited the transfer of sovereignty to any nation except Spain. In
spite of pressure from the Spanish, the referendum was carried out on
10 September, and resulted in resounding support for the British position.
From an electorate of 12,757, a total of 12,182 votes were cast. Those
in favor of continued association with the United Kingdom numbered 12,138;
those in favor of accepting any form of Spanish sovereignty numbered 44.
[Refs. 79 & 80] British elation over the referendum was short-lived,
however.
Supported by a loose coalition consisting primarily of Latin American,
Arab, and Communist nations, Spain successfully called for UN condemna-
tion of the referendum. The majority position in the General Assembly
was that paragraph six of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples was the most relevant issue in the
situation. This document declared that "any attempt at partial or total
disruption of national unity and territorial integrity was incompatible
with the purposes of the United Nations Charter". The minority position
argued that the principle of self-determination as expressed in the UN
Charter was the more relevant issue.
The majority accepted Spain's argument that Gibraltar's population
was not the legitimate historical population of Gibraltar but a fabrica-
tion of the British. The Assembly adopted a resolution calling for both
nations to ignore the results of the referendum and proceed with
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negotiations toward the resolution of the issue. [Refs. 81 & 82] The
Spanish customs post at La Linea was closed (meaning that no goods of
any kind could cross the border in either direction), and on 25 October
the frontier was closed to all but pedestrian traffic. On 2 November
the Spanish Government began refusing to honor passports issued by the
government of Gibraltar at any of its entry points. [Ref. 83]
Britain and Spain sparred over Gibraltar for two more years, out by
this time it was becoming clear that both parties were tiring of the
conflict and wisned to get on with the task of improving relations.
Unfortunately, a mutually acceptable formula continued to elude them.
Spain clarified its earlier offer to recognize the special relationsnip
of the residents of Gibraltar to the United Kingdom. In return for
sovereignty, the Spanish offered to allow Gibraltarians to retain their
British citizenship and municipal autonomy on a parallel with the Basque
provinces.
In Gibraltar, fear tnat Britain might find such an offer attractive
led to tne growth of a movement calling for integration into tne United
Kingdom. The British were unwilling to accept this proposal , out did
agree to negotiations for a new constitution for the colony. Althougn
the 3ritish Government was reluctant to accept any reform which would
cause further deterioration of relations with the Spanish, domestic
sympathy for Gibraltar's plight forced it to accept a constitutional
linkage clause proposed by Gibraltar. Under the new constitution, tne
form and powers of the Gibraltar Government essentially were unaltered
from those under the 1964 constitution. The linkage clause insisted




Her Majesty's Government will never enter into arrangements
under which the people of Gibraltar would pass under the sover-
eignty of another state against their freely and democratically
expressed wishes. [Ref. 84]
Agreement on the constitution was reached on 24 July 1968, with the
constitution to take effect in the following year upon the election of
a new government in Gibraltar. Spain expressed its protest in what had
become the traditional manner: it sealed the last remaining holes in
its siege-wall. As elections approached in the summer of 1969, the
gates at La Linea were permanently closed, removing from Gibraltar's
labor force the last 4,500 Spanish workers. Overland telephone and
telegraph lines were cut, and the last direct link with the neighboring
Spanish countryside, the Algeciras ferry service, was terminated. By
October, Gibraltar's isolation was complete.
D. A MOVE TOWARD MODERATION
In November 1969, barely one month after the last link between Spain
and Gibraltar was cut, Sr. Lopez Bravo replaced Sr. Fernando Castiella
as Franco's Foreign Minister. Castiella long had been personally asso-
ciated with Spain's campaign to regain control of Gibraltar, and was
the chief architect of the strategy of isolation which had brought
Britain and Spain to their present circumstances. Although it is not
known whether the Gibraltar situation was the immediate cause of
Castiella's removal, it certainly did nothing to enhance his effective-
ness as a Foreign Minister. Spain was no closer than ever to achieving
its objective in Gibraltar, where the resident population by now had
developed a deep distrust and dislike for its Spanish neighbors. With
Britain's aid, the economy of Gibraltar was successfully weathering the
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sanctions imposed by the Spanish. The only clear effect of the policy
was to bring relations between Spain and Britain to a new low.
The appointment of the new Foreign Minister signaled a major turning
point in Spanish foreign policy. No longer satisfied to be an isolated
state on the perimeter of Europe, whose closest friends were Third World
states in Latin America, the Middle East, and North Africa, Spain began
seeking recognition as a genuine member of the Western European community
in every sense. Although the decision to seek NATO membership was still
years away, politically astute Spaniards were beginning to talk of member-
ship in the EEC. The probability that Britain would soon join that organ-
ization made her a more important friend.
To be sure, the hard-liners in the Spanish Government still held most
of the power, and Sr. Lopez Bravo did not have a free hand in forming his
policies. There was danger that any significant public back-off from the
earlier official position would be labeled a sellout. Thus the moderation
took the form of reducing the diplomatic conflict to a lower level of
intensity rather than reducing the already imposed Spanish restrictions.
The first manifestation of the policy was the proposal to postpone UN
debate on the Gibraltar question during the 1969 General Assembly session.
The postponement eventually was extended through 1972. In 1972, Lopez
Bravo met twice with Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the British Foreign Secretary.
Both men agreed that an overall improvement in relations between the two
nations was more important than the immediate resolution of the Gibraltar
question, and Lopez Bravo may have indicated privately that he was
resigned for the time being to acceptance of the British position that
there could be no change in the status of Gibraltar without the consent of
its residents. [Refs 85, 86, & 37]
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The decision by Spain to let the Gibraltar issue move to the back
burner is reflected in British press coverage of the issue, which declined
sharply after November 1969. Other than routine news about elections and
normal diplomatic meetings which mentioned Gibraltar within the larger
context of the article, the Economist , for example, ran only four features
on the Gibraltar question in the years 1970-75 as compared to 20 articles
between 1965 and November 1969.
The death of Franco in November 1975 did not result in any immediate
change in Spain's policy regarding Gibraltar. The primary interest of
the new government was completion of a successful and peaceful transition
from dictatorship to democracy, a necessary condition for which was the
avoidance of domestically controversial issues. King Juan Carlos, and
later his Prime Minister Adolpho Suarez, had to deal with the same strong,
hard-line power elite as had Lopez Bravo, and upsetting that group by pub-
licly backing off on the Gibraltar issue would not have been good politics.
The King's first official statement regarding Gibraltar indicated that he
would be even more diligent than Franco in pressing Spain's claim to
sovereignty. Insisting that Spain's claim was no mere creation of Franco's,
Juan Carlos declared that the claim "has formed a continuous part of
Spanish foreign policy since 1713, and when I become head of state I
shall be even more demanding about it". [Ref. 88]
As the transition to democracy moved toward completion, Spain quietly
began new initiatives on the Gibraltar question. Joint talks between the
Spanish and 3ritish were held in 1976 and 1977, with ^ery little press
coverage and none of the public posturing which had markea earlier dis-
cussions. In 1977, telephone service was restored between Gibraltar and

Spain. In 1978, permanent working groups were established to pursue
the issue. Finally, in the spring of 1980, the four years of quiet
discussion produced results. The Lisbon Accords on the reopening of
the Gibraltar frontier were announced on 10 April. In these accords, the
two nations proposed:
... to resolve the Gibraltar problem in a spirit of friend-
ship and in accordance with the appropriate United Nations
resolutions. The two governments have agreed ... to open
negotiations with a view to settling all their differences over
Gibraltar. [Kef. 89]
The Spanish won a British promise that future cooperation would be on
the basis of full equality of rights (measures to end the perceived
insults to Spaniards in Gibraltar?), that the UN resolutions would form
the basis of the negotiations, and that both governments would be prepared
to consider any proposals which the other might wish to make. Through
Spanish acceptance of a clause recognizing that Britain was obligated to
honor the "freely and democratically expressed wishes of the people of
Gibraltar", the British won Spanish recognition of the rights of the
Gibraltarians. It was agreed that all preparations for the restoration
of normal communications between Gibraltar and Spain should be completed
by 1 June, although no firm date for the opening of the border was set.
[Refs. 90, 91, & 92]
Unfortunately, the promise of the Lisbon Accords has yet to be
realized. Spanish preparations for the reopening of the frontier have
dragged out. At first the government of Spain declared that the delay
was only administrative, and that such projects as the construction of
a new customs facility and a suitable parking lot took more time than
expected. But it soon became apparent that there was more to the Spanish
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foot-dragging than administrative red tape. The government seized on
the issje of rights for Spanish workers equivalent to those of EEC
guest workers (Gibraltar has a reciprocal workers rights agreement with
the EEC) as an excuse for delaying action further [Refs. 93 & 94], but
it was becoming apparent that the Suarez government was having trouble
reconciling the powerful right-wing hard-liners to the new agreement.
[Ref. 95]
The coup attempt of February 1981 further weakened the UCD govern-
ment's ability to chart its course from a position of strength with
regard to the country's right-wing element, and it was probably pressure
from the right which prompted the King to announce his decision to boy-
cott the royal wedding in London when it was made known that the Prince
of Wales and his bride would stop in Gibraltar during their honeymoon.
As previously discussed, Spain's new Prime Minister Sr. Calvo-Sotelo
has made full integration of Spain into NATO the top priority of his
foreign policy. Recognizing that some kind of breakthrough on the Gibral
tar question is a necessary precondition for smooth British ratification
of Spanish accession, Calvo-Sotelo has decided to press ahead on the
Lisbon Accords in spite of resistance from the right. In this case,
concern for the appeasement of Spanish conservatives is outweighed by
concern for the effect of an international issue on domestic politics.
Feeling in Britain is strong enough on the Gibraltar issue that,
although ratification might not be completely blocked, a long and acri-
monious debate surely would result if there were no breakthrough. Such
a debate would be an embarrassment to the Spanish Government which would
seriously flaw what Calvo-Sotelo hopes to present to his people as a
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major diplomatic triumph. Consequently, the negotiating teams have
quietly continued to work toward fulfillment of the Lisbon Accords
throughout 1981.
On 8 January 1982, Prime Ministers Thatcher and Calvo-Sotelo met
in London. At the conclusion of the meeting it was announced that the
two had agreed to set 20 April 1982 as the target date for the reopening
of the frontier. [Ref. 96]
E. DISCOMFORT IN GIBRALTAR
Through the years, the residents of Gibraltar have watched the
diplomatic maneuvering of Spain and 3ritain with increasing discomfort.
Their constant fear is that they will be abandoned by a Britain tired
of the economic and political liability of Gibraltar. Their concerns
have not been eased by the decreasing strategic importance of Gibraltar.
The Royal Air Force already has withdrawn from Gibraltar; the number
of port calls by warships has decreased sharply (largely as a result of
reduced British naval presence worldwide); and the dockyards now are
scheduled to be closed in 1984. [Ref. 97] The Gibraltarians were quick
to sense Britain's desire to get on with the task of improving relations
with Spain, and their reaction generally has been to seek increasingly
stronger commitments of linkage from the British Government.
The constitutional debate of 1968 was an early example of the desire
for a stronger commitment, and pressure from Gibraltar resulted in the
British acceptance of the amended preamble. In the 1969 elections, the
first under the new constitution, the Integration With Britain (IWB)
Party of Robert Peliza was able to form a controlling coalition in the
Legislative Council. Although his victory was partly the result of an
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internal dispute within the dominant coalition led by Joshua Hassan,
much of Peliza's support was based on reaction to threatened Spanish
sanctions and the desire for stronger ties with Britain. Peliza's
overtures for full integration with Britain were firmly rebuffed by
London, as they had been in the past, and the Chief Minister effectively
was told to cool the rhetoric and get in step with the low-profile
strategy being pursued in Madrid and London. [Refs. 98 & 99] Men the
labor party of Mr. Hassan was returned to power in 1973 it was not
because of reduced public concern for the linkage issue, but rather
because Mr. Peliza's government had proven itself inept both in civil
administration and in diplomatic dealings with Great Britain.
In the election campaigns of 1976 and 1980, a very few Gibraltarian
politicians endorsed a compromise with post-Franco Spain. In both
instances, however, these candidates finished far down in the balloting
and won no seats under the proportional representation formula of
Gibraltar's constitution. [Refs. 100 & 101]
In the 1980 election, public pressure forced the labor party to
take a strong stand opposing the recognition of the UN resolutions as
the basis for negotiations following the Lisbon Accords. In spite of
the strong stand, the party's share of the vote dropped from 40 percent
in 1976 to 39 percent in 1980. Mr. Joe Bassano of the Gibraltar
Socialist Labor Party, whose campaign was particularly anti-Spanish,
gained most of the votes lost by Mr. Hassan's party. Mr. J. E. Triay,
the leading candidate favoring compromise with. Spain, received less than
three percent of the vote. [Ref, 102]
The Gibraltarians regard the British Nationality Bill now before
Parliament as an indicator of the degree of British commitment to their
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cause. The Commonwealth Act of 1962 took from the people of Gibraltar
(as it did from those of all Britain's remaining colonies) the recogni-
tion of status coequal with British subjects in the United Kingdom.
Most significantly, it removed their guaranteed right of free immigra-
tion to the United Kingdom. The Gibraltarians have been trying since
1962 to get that right restored. The British position always has been
that no restrictions ever will be placed on Gibraltarian immigration,
but they have been unwilling to offer a guarantee with the force of law.
The British nationality Sill before Parliament further distinguishes
three separate types of citizenship for Her Majesty's subjects: British
citizenship (for residents of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands,
and the Isle of Man); citizenship of the British Dependent Territories
(which would apply in the case of Gibraltar); and British Overseas
citizenship—the least British of the British. Against the firm oppo-
sition of the Thatcher government, the Gibraltarians seek a special
amendment which would make them "first class" British citizens under the
law. The House of Lords passed such an amendment on the day following
the announcement by Spain that King Juan Carlos would boycott the royal
wedding. The Commons have rejected such an amendment once; the two
houses now much reach a consensus on the amendment [Refs. 103 & 104]
There is no ambiguity in the Gibraltarian position. The residents
of the Rock are leery of Spanish promises to guarantee them municipal
autonomy, citing the Basque and Catalan disputes as sufficient reason
to avoid placing themselves in jeopardy on that score. They also are
less than convinced of the long term stability of Spanish democracy,
fearing that a return to dictatorship could threaten even the most
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secure legal guarantees. And, not the least of considerations, they
are reluctant to give up the tax, tariff, and public subsidy benefits
which they enjoy under British sovereignty. Any attempt by 3ritain to
compromise their position will be resisted vigorously in Gibraltar.
F. THE OPTIONS
The opening of the gates at Gibraltar after 12 and one-half years,
if it comes about as expected in April, will be a major breakthrough for
Britain and Spain. It will help create a more favorable environment for
resolution of the dispute than has existed since the 1950's, but will
not by itself move the two nations any closer to a permanent settlement.
The basic issue, which is the question of who will exercise sovereignty
over Gibraltar, will remain unresolved.
Four basic options have been discussed over the past 27 years for
the resolution of this issue. The first is acceptance of the status quo:
i.e., permanent recognition of British sovereignty, or Britain's right
to confer upon the Gibral tarians whatever form of government they should
democratically request. This option has been unequivocally rejected by
Spain and is not a negotiable option. Shou ld any Spanish Government
desire to forsake the country's historical claim to the peninsula, such
action would be interpreted as a betrayal by both the right and the
opposition party. The government would almost certainly fall over the
i ssue .
A second option is British acceptance of the Spanish claim to full
sovereignty. This option is equally unlikely to be acceptable.
Legally, the British appear to have the more secure claim, for they
have offered on several occasions since 1964 to submit the dispute to
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the International Court of Justice for resolution, and in each case
the Spanish have refused their offer. More important, the British have
made a genuine commitment to honor the rights of the people of Gibral-
tar and to date have reaffirmed that commitment in every negotiation
with the Spanish. Sympathy in Britain for the Gibraltarian position
might make uncertain the future of any government which abandoned this
commitment.
A third and possibly more attractive alternative is tne idea of a
"condominium" arrangement for snared sovereighty. Several variations
of this idea have been proposed since 1966, with the most popular
variation modeled after the principality of Andorra. Andorra has two
heads of state--the President of France, and the Spanish Bishop of
Urgel
.
Each appoints representatives to administer the state, and
there is a local assembly elected by the citizens. Such a system has
been proposed for Gibraltar, with the additional stipulation that
citizens of Gibraltar would hold both 3ritish and Spanish citizenship.
[Refs. 105 & 106]
This proposal leaves too many questions unanswered. How, for
example, would power be apportioned between the two heads of state
and the elected assemoly? What type of citizenship would the Gibral-
tarians, who do not now have "first class" British citizenship,
receive from Spain? Under whose legal code would the state operate?
Even if the issues were resolved to each party's satisfaction at tne
time of agreement, what would prevent some unforeseen difficulty from
arising later to threaten good relations between the principals? One
does not have to have a terribly good imagination to conceive of
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circumstances which might make Gibraltar NATO's next Cyprus under such
an arrangement. Images of British and Spanish troops fighting to pro-
tect their constituent populations should be serious enough to concern
European diplomats. Because of the complexity of the issues, none of
the parties has shown inclination to consider this option seriously.
The fourth option, the one toward which Spain and Britain seem to
be moving, is some variation_of
_a__pT_an which would utilize the North
Atlantic Treaty Organizati on as the framework for a compromise form of
s hared_spvere i g n ty . What is unclear is exactly how such a proposal
might work. The Sunday Times reported in August 1981 that Calvo-Sotelo's
Foreign Minister, Sr. Perez Llorca, nad offered a new compromise to the
British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, at a private meeting near
Madrid on 16 August. The heart of the compromise was believed to be a
proposal that Spain accept the present constitutional form of government
in Gibraltar in return for Britain's surrender of the naval base to NATO,
with the understanding that NATO would designate a Spanish Admiral to
command the base. [Refs 107 & 108]
Two critical flaws in this proposal were quickly recognized. Under
the constitution of Gibraltar, the Commander of the Naval Base is also
the Governor of Gibraltar, and in that capacity has the power to over-
ride even the Legislative Council if he sees fit. British surrender
of the Command of Gibraltar to a foreigner, especially a Spaniard, would
amount to de facto surrender of sovereignty. The Gibraltarians were
quick to denounce such a possibility. [Ref. 109]
The second flaw concerns the role which NATO would be expected to
play in the administration of Gibraltar. Command of the base would be
a normal responsibility for NATO to assume. Administration of the
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civilian community, de facto sovereignty over the territory, clearly
would be beyond the scope of the Alliance charter. Although there has
been no official comment from Brussels on the matter (no proposals have
been formally submitted), it would be wise for the Alliance to be yery
cautious about assuming such responsibilities in this volatile situation.
Later speculation about the direction of negotiations has hinted
that the Spanish might be willing to allow Britain to retain command of
the base on the condition that the base be made a NATO command subordin-
ate to a Spanish NATO Mediterranean commander, probably based at Cadiz.
[Refs. 110 & 111] Such a proposal would be a major and unexpected con-
cession from the Spanish, and might remove the Gibraltarian objections.
But it would not overcome the concept's second flaw, since presumably
NATO would still exercise ultimate responsibility for all of Gibraltar.
Whether the Alliance should, or legally could, accept such responsibili-
ties is questionable.
G. CONCLUSIONS
Clearly Britain and Spain are moving toward a solution to the Gibral-
tar problem. The movement has been accelerated by the Calvo-Sotelo
government's decision to push for immediate integration into NATO, and
as soon thereafter as feasible into the European Economic Community. The
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee published a report on 28
August which called for quick resolution of the Gibraltar issue. The
report recommended that the British and Gibral tarians yield to the
Spanish demand of status coequal to EEC members for Spanish laborers
in Gibraltar, and declared that relations between Spain and Britain
were more important than the Gibraltar question. [Ref. 112]
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On 4 September, Spanish Defense Minister Oliart announced that
recognition of Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar would not be a pre-
condition for NATO membership. At the same time, he indicated that
Spain would claim NATO command over the Strait of Gibraltar, including
the military base at Gibraltar. [Ref. 113] In an interview with the
Madrid newspaper ABC on 5 September, Foreign Minister Perez Llorca made
the most comprehensive and conciliatory statement to date on the status
of negotiations. Affirming that NATO entry would help decisively in
resolving the Gibraltar issue, he warned against those who demanded a
solution to the problem before entry. Such people, he declared, were
only using the issue as a pretext to create opposition to NATO member-
ship for Spain. Perez Llorca praised the fairness and recommendations
of the Commons Committee report, proclaiming that the government of
Spain fully shared Britain's view that relations between the two nations
were the most important aspect of the dispute. Most significant of all,
he publicly recognized that Britain's commitment not to transfer sover-
eignty over Gibraltar involved a principle which would have to be
respected, stating that he believed a solution could be found which
would not jeopardize that principle. [Ref. 114]
At this point it is clear that, although negotiations are proceeding
in a new environment of understanding and friendship, and although the
border at Gibraltar apparently will be reopened shortly, the realization
of a permanent solution to the Gibraltar question remains a distant goal,
Britain will not yield on her commitment to the democratic rights of the
people of Gibraltar, and those people are not yet ready to consider
acceptance of Spanish sovereignty, whether de jure or de facto. Because
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both 3ritain and Spain now recognize that improved mutual relations are
more important than continued bickering over the Rock, a temporary and
'•satisfactory" solution will be found which will allow Spain's graceful
integration into NATO. The emergence of democracy in Spain has made
this possible, and the priorities of the democratic Spanish Government
have determined that it will be so.
The wound will be dressed, but it will not soon heal. Clearly both
3ritain and Spain hope that time will be the great healer. The reopening
of the border, and the simultaneous closing down of British dockyards,
will force Gibraltar to develop closer economic ties with neighboring
Spain, Perhaps the Gibraltarians will view the sovereignty issue less
emotionally after a generation of friendly relations and close economic
ties with their Spanish neighbors. But until this happens, Britain and
Spain are counting on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to provide
a framework for a temporary solution. During the interim, friction
between the three principals will continue. How that friction affects
NATO in the future will be a function of how successfully Spain is
integrated into the European community, and what role the Alliance
chooses to accept in the administration of Gibraltar.
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IV. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL: DEFINING A PLACE FOR
SPAIN IN THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE
A. OVERVIEW
Separated from the remainder of Europe by the Pyrenees, Iberia
stands alone on the continent's southwestern flank. Althougn geo-
graphically a single unit, Iberia is divided politically and cultur-
ally into two units--Portugal and Spain. The accession of Spain into
NATO will link Portugal geographically to the other continental members
of NATO, and enhance the maritime strategic value of Iberia in both
the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Achieving the greatest
benefit from these developments will require a reorganization of the
command structures of both the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
(SACLANT) , and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). Develop-
ing command structures which are politically acceptable to both Portugal
and Spain will be the most difficult aspect of reorganization, for these
nations are particularly sensitive to issues involving national prestige.
A charter member of NATO, Portugal lies isolated from the other
members of the Alliance, surrounded on the north and east by Spain,
and on the south and west by the Atlantic. Portugal's strategic value
to NATO lies in its dominant position in the eastern Central Atlantic,
buttressed by possession of the Madiera and Azores Islands. Within the
NATO military command structure, Portugal's most significant contribution
has been in the Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLAMT). A major subordinate
commander for SACLANT, COMIBERLANT is responsible for about 600,000
square miles of the Atlantic from the Tropic of Cancer to the northern
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border of Portugal, and ranging westward some 500 miles from the Strait
of Gibraltar. Because of its isolation, Portugal currently maintains a
unique position in NATO's military command structure as the only contin-
ental member whose territorial defense is not the responsibility of a
major Allied Commander. The continental responsibilities do not extend
beyond the Pyrenees for SACEUR, while the responsibilities of SACLANT
stop at Portugal's 12-mile Atlantic territorial limit. iRef. 115]
Unlike Portugal, Spain is connected directly to the rest of Europe
through France, and Spanish Iberia has both Atlantic and Mediterranean
coasts. Under the present NATO military command structure, the Medi-
terranean waters of the Spanish eastern shore of Iberia are the respon-
sibility of SACEUR's subordinate, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces
Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) . The country's southern Atlantic coast, the
Gulf of Cadiz, as well as the territorial waters surrounding the Spanish
Canary Islands off the coast of Morocco, lie within the area of respon-
sibility of COMISERLANT. Spain's northern Atlantic coastal waters, off
Cape Finisterre and the Bay of Biscay, lie within the area of the
Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, East Atlantic (CINCEASTLANT) , another
SACLANT subordinate located in Northwood, U.K.
Both Spain and Portugal informally have expressed concern over the
question of command structure reorganization. As the debate over NATO
membership was approaching its climax in Spain in the early fall of 1981,
the topic of command realignment began to be addressed in the press.
According to one Spanish hypothesis, the most strategically effective
structure would be a joint Iberian command within NATO. The proposal
had military merit, for it recognized the geographic unity of the peninsula
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aid would allow both states to respond flexioly to interests in the
Atlantic or Mediterranean. 6ut tiie Spanisn ijovernment was quick to
disassociate itself officially from the proposal, oyanisn jefense
Minister 01 i art told the press:
. . . altnough the Iberian area is a single geograpnic and
possibly strategic area, Spain's entry into NATO should be
effected respecting the two countries' sovereignty ana indi-
viduality because the good neighborliness and good friendsnip
between Spain and Portugal are based precisely on that . . .
any other formula could bring into crisis or affect that
relationship. [Ref. 116]
Portuguese Defense Minister Sr. Freitas do Amaral forcefully rejected
the joint command proposal. Stating that his government fully appre-
ciated the comments of the Spanish Defense Minister, Amaral cited tnree
reasons for Portugal's rejection of a joint command: tiie first was
historical and political, the second echoed Olivart's concern for
continued friendly relations between tne two nations, and the tnird was
strategic. Amaral remarked that Spain's interests were primarily in
the Mediterranean, wnile Portugal was better suited to continue to
support NATO's Atlantic role. He concluded that, in the Portuguese
view, the Iberian Peninsula should be divided into two geo-strategic
zones: one turned toward Europe, and tne other toward the Mediterranean
area. [Ref. 117]
To understand the intense jealousy with which Spain and Portugal
guard their national identities, and the effect which this will have
on shaping a new NATO command structure, it is necessary to understand
the background of the present situation with regard to each of the
three explanations offered by Sr. Amaral. This chapter will examine





development, the bilateral relationships between the two states, and
the strategic relationships between tne two states relative to the
defense of NATO.
B. THE HISTORICAL DIVISION OF IBERIA
1 . The Emergence of Portuguese Identity
Many foreigners fail to discern any great distinction oetween
Spain and Portugal. Both are Latin nations wnich share a common heritage
and parallel development. Social and political evolution nave oeen
remarkably similar with common periods of Roman, Germanic, and Islamic
influence, Catholic monarchy, revolutionary republicanism, and reaction-
ary dictatorships. Some see Portugal as little different from tne
provinces of Spain save that Portugal Historically has been more success-
ful in resisting the imposition of Spanish domination. In the eyes of
many Portuguese, most Spaniards feel:
... a Portuguese is not a Spaniard. No Portuguese would
say otherwise. . . . Spaniards, however, may take exception to
such a statement, for the belief is traditional in Spain that
the unitary quality of the peninsula is the important fact.
[Ref. 113]
Perhaps it is because of this perception that the Portuguese so aggres-
sively assert their independent prerogatives, whatever the reason,
the roots of Portuguese independence date from pre-Roman times and
remain a dominant force in shaping Portuguese character today.
The Romans moved into Iberia in the third century B.C. to check the
spread of the power of Carthage. As allies against Cartnage, they were
welcomed by the peoples of the warm, dry Mediterranean regions. The
southern Iberians shared many cultural similarities with the Romans,
being previously well -acquainted with Mediterranean civilization through
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contact with the Greeks and Phoenicians. With the peoples of the north-
west, however, the Romans shared little in common. These people had
little previous contact with other Mediterranean civilizations, naving
been influenced more strongly by their Celtic neighbors to the north.
The Celticized peoples of northwestern Iberia resisted the domination of
Rome, and it was to facilitate the pacification of these peoples tnat
the Romans built the great network of paved highways traversing central
Iberia. Throughout the period of Roman domination of Iberia, garrisons
were maintained in the northwest provinces to ensure the subservience of
these peoples.
As Roman power waned, the vacuum in Iberia was filled by migrating
Germanic tribes and, ultimately, by the Roman proxies, the Visigoths.
The Germanic tribes entered the peninsula across the Pyrenees and lived
in peace with the Romans and Iberians for about a generation before the
Romans departed. At least four distinct Germanic tribes entered tne
area, each maintaining its integrity rather than mixing with the other
tribes. The Suebics, an agricultural civilization, selected the cool,
moist northwestern region of Iberia as their area, settling the regions
of the Minho River basin and Galicia.
The Visigothic army which entered Iberia from Gaul in 415 carried a
Roman mandate to rid the peninsula of the Germanic Barbarians. When
the power of Rome collapsed, the Visigoths succeeded the Romans as rulers
of Iberia. Only the Suebics were able to resist conquest by the Visigoths,
maintaining an independent kingdom until 585. Even after 535 the Suebic
civilization was able to maintain its distinct identity in the security of
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the mountains of the northwest, absorbing the culture of the earlier,
Celticized inhabitants of the region.
Visigothic domination ultimately crumbled as effective administration
deteriorated into constant feudal bickering. First invited into the
peninsula as an ally by one of the waring factions, the Islamic Berbers
and Arabs remained as conquerors when they recognized the disarray of
the Visigothic political system. Within two years, by 713, they had
completed the conquest of the peninsula, meeting only limited resistance
centered in the northwest. Finding the cool, wet northwest region not
to their liking anyway, the Moslems were content to withdraw south of
the Douro River, only occasionally sending raiding parties north to
insure the subjugation of the Christianized Iberians to Moslem authority.
It was from the largely Visigothic and Suebic Christain communities of
the north and northwest that the future power of both Spain and Portugal
was to grow. Under the leadership of Pelayo, a Goth, and later his son-
in-law, who became known as Alfonso I, a resurgence of Christian power
began in the province of Leon. It was Alfonso I who devised the strategy
of development which would assure the ultimate emergence of Portugal as
an independent state.
Alfonso's strategy required a buffer between his developing kingdom
and Islamic power. To create this buffer he withdrew all Christian
4Stanislawski [Ref. 118] refers to the Germanic tribe which settled
the Iberian northwest as the Swabians rather than the Suebics. The
Swabians were in fact one branch of the Suebic peoples, but in common
usage the term Swabian is reserved for those Suebic peoples who settled
the Central European region known as Swabia, while the more general term
Suebic is used to refer to the peoples who migrated to Iberia.
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settlements from the area between the ilinno and Uuuro Rivers ana from tne
high plain or mesa south of Leon, leaving the region a political "no-
nan' s-1 and". The security provided by the ouffer alloweu the strength of
Leon and Asturius to grow until a successor to tne crown of Leon, Alfonso
III, felt that his position was secure enougn to Degin resettlement of
the area. At Alfonso Ill's command, the high mesa was resettled by peoples
of southern extraction, decendants of the Visigoths, while tne Jouro-
Minho region was resettled by the peoples of SueDic extraction fro;r. tne
Coimbra and Porto regions. The administration of the Minho region was
separate from that of Galicia, eacn region being placed by the King under
the administration of uauls of the House of Burgundy. Thus tne region
under tne administration of iienry of Burgundy and his wife Tneresa (an
i legitimate daughter of Alfonso III) emerged as a distinct unit in north-
west Iberia to become tne political base of the future state of Portugal.
[Ref. 119] About this same time the region between tne ,'linno and Douro
came to be called the province of Portucalense, after the town of Tortus
Cale (now Porto) at the mouth of tne Douro River. L^ef. 120]
From the time of its emergence as a political unit, the hi story of
Portucalense and tne other Ioerian provinces is cnaracterized by a con-
stant series of crises and wars of royal succession, /nlliam Atkinson
calls it "the old familiar pattern . . . (of) revolts of nobles against
the throne, violent dispatches, repudiated elections, alliances witn the
enemy without, civil war". [Ref. 121] He mignt well have added intrigue,
conspiracy, and assassination to hi s list. It was during one sucn crisis
of succession when the authority of Leon was weakened oy an internal
power struggle and constant combat with Islam that Affonso Henri^es was
able to unilaterally proclaim an end to Portuguese subjegation to the
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crown of Leon. He consolidated his rule by defeating the forces loyal
to his o:.n mother, Theresa, and exiling her from the lands south of the
Douro. In 1139 he proclaimed himself King of Portugal, a title recognized
by Alfonso VII of Spain in 1139, and confirmed in 1179 by Pope Alexan-
der III. [Ref. 122]
2. Maintaining Portuguese Autonomy
Recognition of the Crown of Portugal could not alone guarantee
the security of the state. Between 1128 and 1814, Portugal frequently
found itself defending its independence against the ambitions of stronger
Spanish monarchs. The causes of the wars were nearly always disputes
over the right of succession. The intermarriage of royal families brought
both nations into conflicts over territorial claims not only in Iberia,
but in Italy, France, Sardinia, and Corsica. It was through one of these
intermarriages that the crowns of Spain and Portugal were temporarily
reunited in 1580. Philip II of Spain, a Hapsburg, acceded to the throne
of Portugal when the Portuguese house of Aviz passed without an heir.
As the nearest surviving relative, Philip claimed and secured the here-
ditary crown. During his reign, he continued to allow Portugal to func-
tion as an independent state, with Portuguese holding the positions of
responsibility in the bureaucracy. But his successors, Philip III, and
Philip IV of Spain, placed increasingly tighter reins on Portuguese
autonomy, replacing the Portuguese court with Spanish functionaries.
These policies gave rise to growing resentment, and in 1640, uohn, Duke
of Braganza, led a successful revolt against the Castilian crown. Spain
at the time was burdened with another revolt in Catalonia and a foreign
83

war with France, and ultimately was forced to recognize the independence
of Portugal in tne Treaty of Lisbon in 1663. [Ref. 123] In discussing
the events of this period, Stanley Payne says:
:ione of tnis, nowever, had the effect of blurring Portuguese
interests. Autonomy for domestic government and for tne Portuguese
empire naintained steady continuity of basic Portuguese institucions
and tne occasional Hapsburg attempts at interference provoked sharp
discontent. In tne late sixteentn century, association with the
Hapsburg crown seemed to uenefit Portugal's primary interests. , hen
tnat ceased to be the case a half century later, national spirit
came to tne fore and seized the first good opportunity to end the
dynastic association. [Ref. 124]
In the age of empire ouilding, and later in the decline of imper-
ialism, Portugal and Spain experienced coincidental patterns of develop-
ment and deterioration. The age of empire Degan witn the Portuguese
expedition to conquer Ceuta in 1415. Organized uy Jonn I and his Englisn
wife, Philippa of Lancaster, it was the first venture by either state
beyond the confines of Iberia. [Ref. 125] Throuynout the 15 th and lb en
centuries, the rapid expansion of tne empires of both Spain and Portugal
brought the two nations into frequent conflict and dispute. In 1493, ;'0^e
Alexander VI sanctioned tne division of the unexplored world between
Spain and Portugal. The Treaty of Tordesillas, signed one year later,
gave 3razil to Portugal and fixed the global perspectives of each nation
for centuries to come. [Ref. 126] Spanish interests were to be dominant
in the Mediterranean and the New World; ,-ortuguese influence was concen-
trated in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, witn settlements in the
Azores, Hadieras, Africa, and Brazil making the Atlantic a virtual
Portuguese lake. The Portuguese view of tneir role in i4AT0 today can




Portuguese foreign policy always has nad as a primary concern
the preservation of Portuguese autonomy relative to its stronger neighDor,
Spain. First cooperation and then alliance wi ch England has ueen a lyncn-
oin of that policy. The first contact with the English came in the south-
ward expansion of Portugal to its present size in the 1140's. Porto
became a stopping place for crusaders embarked for the Holy Land by sea.
They were welcomed effusively by Affonso Henri ques, and were persuaded
by him to aid in driving the Moslems from the area which is now southern
Portugal before they pressed on to the Levant. Embarking his own forces
with those of the crusaders, Affonso conducted an invasion by sea of the
Tejo River basin, and succeeded in defeating the Moslems. Many English
crusaders were among tnose who fought for his cause, and one of them,
Gilbert of Hastings, remained to become the first bishop of Lisbon. [Ref.
127] The first commercial alliance with England was concluded in 1294,
wi th a fishing rights treaty following in 1353, and the first military
alliance in 1380 or 1381. [Ref. 128] In 1385, English military power
was decisive in the defeat of the forces of the Spanish state of Castile
at the Battle of Aljuoarrota, and securing the claim of John I to tne
throne of Portugal
.
Out of that victory, and of that change of dynasty, came
in 1386 the formal alliance- 'forever' -with England. Reaffinned
down the centuries as a sheet anchor in tne policies of both coun-
tries, the today oldest alliance in existence, it bound alike the
two thrones and two peoples to the defense of eacn other's
interests and territories. [Ref. 129]
In subsequent years the English alliance was to prove crucial
to Portugal's survival. English forces were a factor in the Portuguese
revolt against Hapsburg rule at the end of the period of the Union of
the Crowns (1580-1640). Portugal and England were allies against Spain
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in the War of Spanish Succession, in which Portugal lost Ceuta to Spain.
In the Napoleonic Wars, English forces helped secure Portuguese indepen-
dence after combined French and Spanish armies invaded Portugal in 1801,
and again in 1807.
3. The Modern Iberian Struggle: Liberalism or Conservatism?
The independence and security of Portugal were finally assured
by the Congress of Vienna and the rise of liberalism in Iberia, which
turned the energies of both Spain and Portugal inward for the next one
and a half centuries. Spain was a leader in the movement toward
nationalism and liberalism at the beginning of the 19th century, and
the pattern of liberal and reactionary conflict which emerged in Spain
was repeated in other countries throughout the continent.
Spain first captured the imagination of patriots and reform-
ers in central Europe with the national rising against Napoleon.
Subsequently, the 1812 Constitution (of Spain) served as an inspir-
ation to liberals in Italy and Portugal, and Spain in fact led the
process of political democratization in Western Europe until 1843.
. . . The Spanish pattern of conspiracy and revolt by liberal army
officers . . . was emulated in both Portugal and Italy. [Ref. 130]
Ultimately the liberal movement in Portugal proved stronger and
more stable than that of Spain, for the Portuguese were able to establish
a constitutional monarchy which functioned fairly effectively, though
not without difficulty, until 1910. On the other hand, Spain was unable
to form any lasting government. Continually troubled by conflict between
liberal and reactionary forces, and unable to form a popular consensus,
the Spanish people suffered through the two Carlist Wars and numerous
periods of government crises and paralyses between 1812 and 1923.
At the onset of World War I, the Portuguese Government was in the
hands of a radical republic dominated by a new middle class, while Spain
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was struggling to preserve the existence of the latest government of its
constitutional monarchy. Portuguese sympathies, especially those of the
liberal Democrats, were with the Triple Entente. Winning power in the
elections of 1915, the Democrats succeeded in getting Portugal into the
war as an ally of Great Britain by seizing 36 German ships which had been
blocaded in the Tejo River, and turning them over to the 3ritish. Germany
declared war on Portugal shortly thereafter. [Ref. 131] The energy of
Spain was absorbed during the war years by the struggles to subdue Kabyle
rebels in Morocco, and to suppress rising regionalism in Catalonia and
the Basque provinces. These internal problems finally led to the collapse
of the constitutional government in 1923, and its replacement by the
liberal dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. The fall of the Portuguese
republic to a bloodless military coup in May 1926 placed all of Iberia
under authoritarian rule.
Spain tried once more to establish democratic rule in the inter-
war period when Primo de Rivera, in ill health, was dismissed by King
Alfonso XIII in 1930, Although Primo had intended his dictatorship to
be an interim government, maintaining power only until stability could
be reestablished, the institutions of democracy proved hard to rebuild.
The republican government which succeeded the dictatorship was never
able to fashion a coalition which could govern effectively. The goals
of the first government were an inconsistent mix of factional objectives
including the reduction and reformation of Army power, complete separ-
ation of church and state, Catalan autonomy, and a vague commitment to
social and economic reform. [Ref. 132] These goals proved inconsistent
with the greater needs of the nation, and were beyond the ability of
the government to implement. As the decade advanced, the government
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became more and more radically revolutionary, partly in response to the
rise of Fascism in other parts of Europe. Finally, the radical policies
of the government triggered a revolt in 1936 which led to the bloody
Spanish Civil War and the fall of the government to the forces of Franco
in 1939.
4. From Dictatorship to Democracy
Unlike other governments of Europe, Portugal refused to observe
neutrality in the Spanish Civil War, and from the beginning, clearly
aligned itself with the forces of Franco and General Mola. The Portu-
guese Government saw the war as a threat to its own authoritarian rule,
and took steps to facilitate a victory for the conservative forces.
In Portugal, under the dictatorship of Antonio Salazar, the
silent masses would have welcomed the victory of the Popular
Front (republican left) as a step toward their own liberation.
3ut the government and the military have given every facility
to the insurgents during the preparation of the revolt, and
from the first day of the civil war, Portugal was a thinly
disguised base of supply for the insurgents. 5 [Ref. 133]
Portugal was the first state to support Franco openly oy sending
a representative to his headquarters in December of 1937. At the con-
clusion of the Civil War, Spain and Portugal quickly signed a treaty of
mutual friendship—the first such treaty between the two nations. [Ref. 134]
5This statement is not precisely true, since Salazar was nominally the
Minister of Finance at the time, while the head of government was Antonio
Oscar de Fragase Carmona, but it is true in essence, since Salazar held
most of the reins of power behind Carmona.
^The only earlier agreement was the Quadruple Alliance, in which Spain
and Portugal both participated following the Napoleonic Wars. However,
this was not an alliance of friendship, but rather an attempt to stabilize
power relationships in Europe among the signatory states.
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Both Spain and Portugal were able to maintain their neutrality
during the Second World War, but only through great tenacity and delicacy.
Although Franco owed a debt of gratitude to Germany and Italy for their
aid during the Civil War, he knew that the stability of his economy and
his government could be jeopardized by foreign commitments which over-
extended his power.
From the start . . . Franco carefully measured his pro-German
orientation. Each change in the international situation increased
his wariness, and he knew enough about war and Spain's own weak-
ness to prefer continued neutrality. . . . 3y 1943, the Spanish
regime had developed a three-war theory of the global conflict:
in the war between Communists and anti -Communists in eastern
Europe, Spain was declared to favor the German anti-Communists.
... in the war between the Axis and the Allies in western Europe,
Spain was neutral; in the struggle between the western allies and
Japan in the Far East, Spain favored the allies. [Ref. 135]
The Salazar government of Portugal, although dismayed by the German
attack on Catholic Poland, still was careful to avoid involvement in the
war. Britain let it be known that she would accept Portuguese neutrality
as fulfillment of the obligations of the old alliance between the nations.
During this time, the only pressure on Portugal came after the United
States entered the war. Bases in the Azores were essential to the American
war effort, and in 1943 Portugal bowed to Allied pressure by granting
port and air facilities. [Ref. 136] Despite this concession, however,
Portugal retained a nonbelligerent status. The 1939 Treaty of Friendship
between Portugal and Spain was expanded into a mutual consultation pact
after the fall of France, and the two nations emerged from the war
closer politically than they had ever been.
After the war, both nations were the targets of scorn from the
victorious liberal Europeans, but Spain more so than Portugal. The
Soviet Union made both the target of "anti -Fascist" propaganda campaigns,
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along with Sweden, Switzerland, and Argentina. [Ref. 137] Spain's
association with Germany in the days of the Civil War, and its obvious
attempt to play the winds of fortune to advantage during the course of
the war, brought the sternest condemnation from other Europeans; Por-
tugal's traditional alliance with Britain, and firm neutral position
(which leaned toward the Allies if it leaned at all), left that nation
with better postwar European relations than Spain. In 1949, Portugal was
invited to become the only nondemocratic member of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, largely at the insistence of the United States,
and with the support of her old ally, Great Britain. The reason for
U.S. insistence on Portuguese participation was the dominant position
of Portugal in the Atlantic, and her control of the Azores, an essential
link between North America and Europe. [Ref. 138] Portugal favored
Spanish membership in NATO in 1949, but the northern European refusal
to accept Franco as an ally was absolute. [Ref. 139]
During the decade of the 1970's, both nations moved from dicta-
torship toward democracy. Commencing with a coup in 1974, and teeter-
ing on the verge of radical liberalism and communism before the power
of the center was reasserted the following year, Portugal's transition
initially was more uneven. Today the Portuguese Government has nearly
completed its transition to democracy, although the Military Council
of the Revolution still retains certain veto powers.
Spain's transition was less traumatic, as a surprisingly smooth
transition to constitutional monarchy followed the death of Franco in
November 1975. The democratic movement in both nations has been wel-
comed enthusiastically throughout Western Europe, but domestic challenges
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to the stability of democratic institutions remain present in both.
The final chapter in the struggle for control of the government between
various elements of Iberian policy has not yet been written for either
state.
5, Current Implications
Although Spain and Portugal share a common heritage and similar
development, their friendship is relatively recent. Historically,
interests of the two have more often clashed than coincided. Prior to
the Congress of Vienna, Spain and Portugal were frequently on opposite
sides in military confrontations, with Portuguese autonomy always in
the balance. The only precedent for a true alliance between Spain and
Portugal has been the personal alliance of the two Iberian dictators,
Franco and Salazar. While the convergence of present interests of the
two states makes continued friendship desirable for both, a strong
tradition of competition and insecurity remains in the relationship,
especially for the historically weaker partner, Portugal. This tradi-
tion helps explain the jealousy with which the Portuguese guard their
national identity, and the concern of the Defense Ministers of both
nations that any restructuring of the NATO command respect the indiv-
uality of both.
C, BILATERAL TIES BETWEEN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL
In view of the long history of conflict and suspicion between Spain
and Portugal, it should not be surprising that bilateral social and
economic ties between the two nations are limited. In spite of their
common border, the two states actually have been quite isolated from
one another geographically. Differences in language and global per-
spective have increased their social and economic isolation.
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The lands which lie along the border between Spain and Portugal
tend to be what Stanislawski calls "zones of indifference". These
areas are sparsely populated and of little economic significance. In
the north, the border is mountainous; in the south it is hot and arid.
Transportation routes across the border are limited. There are only
four railroad border crossings and seven major roadway crossings.
[Ref. 140] Although much of the Spanish high central plain is drained
by the six rivers whicn flow from Spain into Portugal, none of these
rivers is navigable above the border. Spanish commerce to and from
the interior flows through Spanish ports on the Bay of Biscay, Gulf of
Cadiz, or the Mediterranean Sea rather than through the Portuguese
ports of Lisbon or Porto. This limits commercial contact between the
states. [Ref. 141]
Language acts as a further barrier to commerce between the states.
The Portuguese language is a remarkably uniform language throughout the
country, and contains many more words of Celtic or Germanic origin than
the Spanish languages. Within Spain, four different languages are
spoken: Castilian or classic Spanish, Catalan, Basque, and Gallegan.
In general, these languages have stronger roots in Latin and Arabic than
the Portuguese language. The exception is Gallegan, the language of
Galicia, which virtually was indistinguishable from Portuguese until
the 15th century, and which remains quite similar. Castilian Spanish
is the national language of the government of Spain, and the one which
diplomatic and commercial relations are conducted. [Refs. 142 & 143]
The effects of geographical and linguistic separation are reflected
in the statistics on tourism and travel for the two nations. In 1975
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4.8 million Portuguese crossed the Spanish border, a figure equivalent
to half the population of Portugal, and 14 percent of Spain's total
tourist volume. But the Spanish Government estimates that most of these
Portuguese were transients, enroute to and from jobs in Europe beyond
the Pyrenees. A very low proportion actually remained to visit or
conduct business in Spain. [Ref. 144]
On the other hand, 52 percent of Portugal's tourists in 1973 were
Spanish. This figure also is somewhat misleading, for the majority
of these were excursionists, crossing into Portugal for one-day visits
to the beaches of the Gulf of Cadiz, spending very little money, and
developing no permanent relationships. [Ref. 145]
Military and security relations between the two nations remain good,
but are not extensive. The Iberian Pact agreement, dating from World
War II, was allowed to lapse following the transition to democracy in
both nations. There is a military officer exchange training program
between Spain and Portugal, but it is small in scale and only one of
several similar programs conducted by each of the nations. [Ref. 146]
During the interlude between the Portuguese coup in 1974 and the death
of Franco in 1975, there were minor problems with militant Portuguese
right-wing radical organizations operating from bases within Spain.
However, since the establishment of the reign of Juan Carlos, there
have been no further problems. [Ref. 147]
Surprisingly, commercial trade between the two nations is limited.
The elements of isolation discussed above led to the development of
historical trade patterns which remain largely unchanged today. Great
Britain has been a major trading partner of Portugal since the time of
the reconquest. Portuguese membership since 1972 in the European Free
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Trade Association and the combined EFTA/EEC free market has tended to
direct her trade toward northern Europe and away from Spain— not a
member of either organization. Colonial trade, which historically
accounted for a large proportion of Portuguese commerce, has been
replaced to some extent by a greater European connection. [Ref. 148]
Spain under Franco tended to be more autarkic than Portugal, and only
during the last 15 years of the dictatorship did the country develop
a strategy for international trade. Because the United States was one
of the few developed nations willing to open trade relations with Spain
in the years after World War II, it became Spain's major partner in the
1950's and 1960's. Since the mid-1960's, Spain has been developing her
European trade, but failure of the EEC to accept Spain as a member has
slowed the process. [Ref. 149] Finally, commerce between Spain and
Portugal also tends to be limited because the two nations have duplicate
economies: that is, the products and resources of each tend to compete
with rather than complement the products and resources of the other.
[Ref. 150]
In 1980, Portugal ranked 33rd among nations in imports to Spain
(23rd if petroleum imports are excluded), and seventh among nations in
value of Spanish exports purchased. Expressed as a percentage, trade
with Portugal accounted for less than 0.5 percent of Spain's import
volume, and only 2.7 percent of her export volume. At the same time,
Spain was ninth among purchasers of Portuguese exports, and sixth in
value of goods sold to Portugal. (Iraq, from whom Portugal purchased
most of its oil in 1980, was the only oil-exporting nation ranked ahead
of Spain.) This amounted to 3.5 percent of Portuguese exports, and 5.7
percent of her imports. These figures represent a stable pattern since
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1975. The only significant changes reflect the rapidly increasing
price of petroleum and the dismantling of Portuguese interests in
the former colony of Angola, which has disappeared as a major trading
partner of Portugal. In 1979, the value of Portuguese exports to
Sweden, Switzerland, and Belgium/Luxembourg all exceeded the value of
exports to Spain. [Refs. 151 & 152]
The relationships between Spain and Portugal today are friendly,
but the ties are not nearly so strong as those that bind other NATO
member states. There are no dependency relationships, and it is
clearly the desire of both nations that this remain so. Spanish invest-
ment in Portugal, for example, is limited by Portuguese concern to
avoid Spanish economic domination. [Ref. 153] The economic and social
costs of any future political rift between the two states would there-
fore be low.
The absence of strong bilateral ties which might cement the friend-
ship between Spain and Portugal helps explain why both nations are
approaching the issues of NATO command reorganization cautiously. The
phraseology selected by the Spanish Defense Minister to describe his
nation's position regarding these issues takes on greater meaning when
viewed in the context of limited relations between the states. Oliart
chose his words carefully and precisely when he said that any NATO
command realignment which fails to respect the "sovereignty and indivd-




D. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIPS AND THE DEFENSE OF NATO
In the islands and enclaves of the Mediterranean and North Atlantic,
Portugal and Spain retain a legacy of their years of Empire. This legacy
plays a major role even today in shaping the way each of the nations
perceives the role it should play in NATO, and indeed in shaping how
NATO perceives the strategic contribution of each.
For the Portuguese, the legacy sustains the Atlantic perspective
first stirred to life in the conquest of Ceuta in 1415. The Portuguese
continental land mass is small compared with the vast expanse of ocean
within the "Portuguese Triangle" formed by the Madieras, the Azores,
and the mainland. The Madiera Archipelago lies some 650 miles west-
south-west of Gibraltar, 500 miles off the Moroccan coast at Casablanca
and 700 miles southwest of Lisbon. The Azores lie further into the
Atlantic, 1000 miles west of Porto, centrally located within the basin
east of the mid-Atlantic ridge. The area enclosed by this triangle
includes over a third of a million square miles of ocean. The Portuguese
mainland faces entirely on the Atlantic, presenting a coastline of some
450 miles and the major ports of Lisbon and Porto. The strategic signi-
ficance of facilities located in the triangle is unmistakable. From
bases in the Azores, NATO can control both the lines of communication
from the South Atlantic to Central Europe, and the northern approaches
to Gibraltar and the Mediterranean.
The Madiera Islands control the southern approaches to the Mediter-
ranean, and provide a base from which to extend the protection of vital
European oil supply routes around the hump of Africa to the Tropic of
Cancer-- the limit of NATO's area of concern. It has been said that
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65 percent of Western Europe's oil, and 57 percent of all other major
import commodities pass through the Portuguese Triangle enroute to
Europe. [Refs. 154 & 155] The mainland itself offers port and air
facilities necessary to the Alliance for logistic and administrative
support of any action in Southern Europe, and which could perform the
same functions relative to the Central Front if required.
Most of the area of the Portuguese Triangle lies within the NATO
area of responsibility of the Commander, Iberian Atlantic. IBERLANT
is strictly a maritime command, its only responsibility ashore being
the subordinate Madeira Islands Command. The primary responsibility
of IBERLANT is control of the Atlantic approaches to Gibraltar—a
necessary precondition to support of the successful defense of Southern
Europe. The eastern limit of IBERLANT's responsibility is at five
degrees, 55 minutes west longitude, just on the Atlantic side of Gibraltar
beyond Spanish and Moroccan territorial waters. The headquarters of
COMIBERLANT is ashore at Oeiras, near Lisbon. The commander always has
been an American Rear Admiral, the current encumbant being Radm. Tyler
F. Dedman. Prior to Dedman's arrival, however, the post was temporarily
held by the Portuguese Deputy Commander, Rear Admiral Elias de Costa.
[Ref. 156] Radm. Dedman is scheduled to depart in 1982, and beginning
at that time, a firm commitment has been made to assign permanently a
Portuguese officer as Commander. [Ref. 157] Simultaneously, IBERLANT
is to be upgraded from "Commander", to "Commander in Chief" status-
it is to become CINCI3ERLANT, with a Portuguese "three star" replacing
the American "two star" Admiral.
COMIBERLANT has no forces permanently assigned, but during wartime
would take command of those naval and air forces assigned to him by
97

SACLANT. Although in wartime all of Portugal's meager naval forces
would be absorbed by IBERLANT, the greatest part of the forces required
to perform the command's mission would have to come from other NATO
nations, primarily the United States and United Kingdom.
The defense of continental Portugal is a national responsibility,
with neither SACEUR nor SACLANT charged with coordinating the defense
of the nation. In addition to its national defense commitment, the
Portuguese Army is tasked by NATO to supply one division to CINCSOUTH
for the defense of Southern Europe. However, since the Angola War
and the 1974 coup, the Portuguese Army has been in disarray and the
requirement has been waived. Currently Portugal only has one Brigade,
the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade, earmarked for NATO defense. [Ref.
158] The Portuguese Air Force has only limited capabilities, and would
probably divide its resources between ground support for the Portuguese
Brigade in Southern Europe, and national surveillance and defense in
the Atlantic coastal area. [Ref. 159] The ground support capability
will be improved over the next two years with the acquisition of two
squadrons of American A-7 aircraft, but the total number of tactical
aircraft will not be increased significantly owing to the retirement
of older aircraft.
Portugal has enjoyed its special status as the key to NATO control
of the South-Central Atlantic and the Mediterranean approaches. The
Portuguese are well aware that the strategic value of the Portuguese
Triangle is what first convinced the Allies to invite them to join
the Alliance, and they are reluctant to share the leverage and prestige
which this position offers. Regarding Spanish entry into NATO, and
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the restructuring of command, they are nearly unanimous. Says Portuguese
defense analyst Alvaro Vasconcelo:
The accession of Spain to the Alliance is, from the Portu-
guese point of view, both desirable and necessary. First, because
NATO will thereby be reinforced, which is in the interest of Por-
tugal. Secondly, because of the bearing that accession may have
on the consolidation of democracy in Spain. Nothing would be more
harmful to Portugal than a new dictatorship in Spain. . . . There
is nonetheless room for some concern in civilian and military
circles as to the distribution of NATO commands once Spain becomes
a member of the Alliance. For historical and psychological reasons
... it would seem desirable to share tasks between Spain and
Portugal. Some people maintain that Spain has a more Mediterra-
nean vocation while Portugal has an Atlantic vocation. [Yet . .
.]
there can be no doubt as to the importance of simultaneously rein-
forcing the defense agreements between the two Iberian countries.
[Ref. 160]
Vasconcelo' s viewpoint has been echoed in the left and right wing
press in Portugal. Reporting for the leftist daily Espresso in Septem-
ber 1981, Miguel Almeida Fernandes stated that the position of Portugal
should be one of total opposition to unified command in Iberia, and
that Portugal should insist on the creation of a second, separate com-
mand for Spain when accession takes place. [Ref. 161] Tempo , a conser-
vative journal, has voiced similar concerns. Among Portuguese problems
associated with Spanish accession, declared Tempo , will be the risk of
accepting inferior status relative to Spain. Of particular concern in
this regard will be the division of responsibilities within the NATO
command structure. [Ref. 162]
The implication is clear: Portugal hopes to retain the dominant
position in the Atlantic. The nation's leadership appears willing to
consider sharing the responsibility for the defense of the peninsula
with Spain. As to the SACLANT command structure, however, the Porguguese
consider IBERLANT and the Portuguese Triangle to be their sacred realm.
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•<hile the Portuguese talk about tneir Atlantic Triangle, the Spanish
talk about their strategic Balearic-Gibraltar-Canaries Axis. iRef. 163]
The axis reflects the traditional Spanish preoccupation with a North
African threat which predates even the Spanish possession of Morocco
and the war against the <ybyle rebels, going back to the time of the
Moslem occupation of Iberia. The Balearic Islands are located in the
western basin of the Mediterranean, east of Valencia and miuway between
Spain and Sardinia. The Canary Islands are in the Atlantic, 800 miles
southwest of Gibraltar, and 275 miles south of Portugal's Madeira Islands,
A line drawn from the Balerics to the Canaries, through Gibraltar,
roughly defines the traditional "front line" of Spanish defense against
the threat of Islam. Lying along the axis, just inside Gibraltar on
the African coast of the Mediterranean, are the Spanish enclaves of
Melilla and Ceuta, legal claim to which is disputed by Morocco.
In addition to the Moroccan claim against the enclaves, Spain also
is troubled by an Arab and Communist backed separatist movement in the
Canaries, and by bickering between Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, and
Polisaro guerrilla forces over sovereignty in the former territory of
Spanisn Sahara where Spain still has important political interests.
Seeing a parallel in the eighth century conquest of Iberia by Islam,
many Spaniards are more concerned today by the tnreat of Communist
influence in the Mahgreb and West Africa than the threat of a Communist
invasion through Western Europe. The southern threat remains an impor-
tant determinant of national policy. Despite the wishful thinking of
some Portuguese, it is clear that a portion of this southern tnreat
originates on the Atlantic side of the Strait of Gibraltar.
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The unstable situation on the Atlantic coast of "forth Africa does
not represent Spain's only Atlantic interest. Over 40 percent of Spain's
coastline and the majority of her ports are located on the Atlantic.
Spain has a longer Atlantic coastline than Portugal. With approximately
500 miles on the north coast, and another 175 miles facing the Gulf of
Cadiz on the south, Spain easily exceeds Portugal's total coastline of
450 miles. On the north coast are the major ports and shipbuilding
centers of 3ilbao and El Ferrol . South of Portugal are the major port
of Cadiz and the Guadalquivir River, historic waterway to Sevilla. Tne
Spanish Navy, which has more than three times the number of warships
as its Portuguese counterpart, stations most of its ships and men in the
Atlantic. El Ferrol is headquarters for the Cantabrian regional naval
command, while San Fernando, near Cadiz, is headquarters for the Straits
command. [Refs. 164 & 165] The Spanish also are quick to point out that
possession of tne Canary Islands, and control of the coastline conti-
guous to the approaches to Gibraltar, places Spain in a better position
to control those approaches than Portugal.
With interests as important as these in the Atlantic, understandably
Spain is less than eager to forego participation in the NATO command of
tne area. 3ut, unlike the Portuguese, the Spanish have yet to agree
fully among themselves regarding the role their nation should seek in
a restructured NATO military comnand. For example, Minister of Defense
Oliart has stated clearly that the Spanish Government's position is
that Spanish national territories and territorial waters should fall
within the control of a unified Spanish command in the NATO context.
[Ref. 166] Yet, as discussed in the opening remarks of this chapter,
Oliart previously rejected the concept of a unified Iberian command
101

for the peninsula owing to the problems already discussed. Oliart has
not discussed how his government proposes to meet the two distinct sets
of conditions, and still build an effective command structure within NATO.
One analyst who does offer a concrete plan is Antonio Sanchez-Gi jon,
the former foreign editor of the liberal newspaper, Madrid . One of
Spain's more progressive, globally-oriented foreign policy and defense
analysts, Sanchez-Gi jon is convinced that a unified Iberian command is
the only effective way to integrate Spain into NATO. He proposes a plan
modeled after the 3ritish Channel Command as an interface between the
Atlantic and Europe, responsible to SACEUR for the defense of Iberia and
to SACLANT for the security of the Eastern Central Atlantic. To sweeten
the pot for the Portuguese, Sanchez-Gijon proposes that the Azores be
taken from COMWESTLANT and incorporated into the new Iberian unified
command. [Ref. 167] This, of course, is precisely the solution which the
Portuguese wish to avoid.
As Portugal is well aware, the sympathies of NATO's military strat-
egists are likely to lie with the Spanish for a number of reasons. First
the peninsula is a strategic entity, and a unified command would, in
theory, provide the most effective form of administration. Military
commanders will be eager to avoid possible areas of contention over
command authority such as those which arise periodically in the Aegean
between Greece and Turkey. Secondly, tne division of command authority
into what would amount to areas of virtual national responsibility rubs
against the very premise of joint action upon which the alliance is
founded. Finally, from a purely pragmatic point of view, the disparity
in military capabilities between Spain and Portugal clearly weighs
in favor of Spain. The Portuguese themselves are willing to admit,
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however sadly, that the Armed Forces of the nation are not capable of
meeting their alliance defense commitments; none of the three services is
capable of meeting its ambitious commitments alone. L^efs. 168 & 169]
Operating in cooperation with the Spanish Cantabrian and Straits naval
forces, however, the Portuguese and Spanish jointly could assemble a
naval force nearly capable of independently guaranteeing the security
of the area assigned to IBERLANT. Jointly, the armies of Spain and
Portugal would be adequate to assure the security of the peninsula
against any anticipated threat, and combined Air Forces would be more
able to provide the required support to ground forces, and fill the
peninsula's air defense mission requirements.
E. NATO'S OPTIONS
The probable positions from which Portugal and Spain will begin
bargaining on the command structure issue are as follows: Portugal
will insist that the IBERLANT command in the Atlantic remain unaltered,
suggesting that Spain be offered a .Mediterranean maritime command as
quid pro quo. Further, Portugal will demand that the commitment to
upgrade the IBERLANT Commander's billet and fill it with a Portuguese
Vice Admiral be honored.
On the other hand, Spain will request that all Spanish coastal
waters, both Atlantic and Mediterranean, fall under the control of a
single command headed by a Spanish Admiral. This command would include
control of the Canary Island archipelago. Some Spaniards may prefer
that Portugal be given a section of the present IBERLANT area as a
separate command, while others will be willing to welcome the Portuguese
into a .joint command as junior partners— if the Portuguese accept.
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Portugal and Spain may be more willing to accept a plan for a joint
defense of Iberia itself, based on the precedent of the Iberian Pact.
Under such a plan, a combined staff might coordinate the defense of the
peninsula while combat troops remained under the command of their own
officers. As a bottom line, both nations initially will dismiss, out
of hand, any plan which places the control of territory or territorial
waters under the command of the other nation's military control.
In this situation, room for compromise will be limited. 3ecause of
the geographical relationship between the Madeira and Canary Islands,
and because the Atlantic coast of Portugal bifurcates the Spanish Atlantic
coast, it will not be possible to divide the Atlantic sector into zones
of national responsibility without excessive gerrymandering which would
make impossible any meaningful coordination between commands. Retention
by the United States of the Commander's billet at IBERLANT might make
Spain more willing to accept the status quo existing in that command, but
this would be totally unacceptable to the Portuguese, who have been pres-
suring the Alliance for this signal of prestige since the creation of
the command in 1967. The creation of a separate command for the Spanish
in the Mediterranean would further aggravate Portugal's Alliance rela-
tions if the IBERLANT command were not turned over to them.
Therefore, the planned transition to a Portuguese CINCIBERLANT will
proceed as scheduled. It is clear that one or both of the nations will
have to give way on some demands. The solution will have to be a




Politics will take precedence over military- strategic considerations.
The Alliance is, after all, an intergovernmental alliance which respects
the soveriegnty and independence of member states. In assessing the
costs of concessions, even in the case of military command restructuring,
political costs will weigh heavier than military costs. Therefore, tne
restructuring solution which imposes the least political concession cost
on Spain and Portugal could possibly resemble the following:
1. A joint military staff may be established to plan and coordinate
the defense of Iberia. Each state will maintain ultimate control of
forces on its own soil. Immediate command of all forces will be vested
in their own officers, probably at the division level, but perhaps at a
lower level. The joint staff will cooperate closely with SACEUR, but
may not be directly responsible to him. Spain, like Portugal, may
initially commit a token ground force to SACEUR, earmarked for use out-
side Iberia, but not predeployed.
2. SACEUR will bear part of the cost of improving the logistics
and base infrastructure of peninsula facilities, but command will be
retained by national authorities, as is presently the case with NATO
training facilities in Portugal, and with U.S. bases in Spain and the
Azores. SACEUR will have formal agreements with each state for facil-
ities utilization.
3. Portugal will receive the command of IBERLANT as scheduled,
with little modification to its boundaries. Spain will receive a
subordinate Island Command for the Canaries. Based on precedent, this
is a small-cost concession for the Spanish. The Azores are an
Island Command under COMWESTLANT, and Iceland and Greenland also are
Island Commands within zones commanded by foreign military officers.
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4. Spain will receive a regional maritime command within the Med-
iterranean, subordinate to CIMCSOUTH and SACEUR. The boundaries of
the command probably will coincide with the Mediterranean portion of
the United States/Spanish Zone of Common Interest (ZCI) as defined by
the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two nations.
The ZCI extends westward from seven degrees east longitude, and includes
the 3alearic Islands and Alboran Basin. As a concession to the Spanish,
it is conceivable that the western limit of the command might ue ex-
tended from five degrees, 55 minutes west longitude, out into the
iulf of Cadiz to about seven degrees, 20 minutes west longitude. The
boundary will then coincide with the mouth of the vauadiana estuary,
the boundary between Spain and Portugal. This will allow Spain to
maintain the integrity of the Straits Command located in San Fernando.
5. Spain will place a senior naval officer on the staffs of both
CINCI3ERLANT and C0MEASTLA.1T, within whose zone lies Spain's nortnern
Atlantic coast.
6. formally Spanish naval forces may not be assigned to CINCIBER-
LAiJT, but may perform only national tasking within his area of respon-
sibility. If this is the case, CINCIBERLANT will continue to depend
primarily on the United States and tne United .Kingdom to provide forces
for assignment to his coirmand. In terms of strategic cost, this may be
the most disappointing aspect of the command structure.
The most controversial aspects of the command realignment will be
those dealing with the maritime commands. Spain's claim to a maritime
command in the 3ay of Biscay will bring it into conflict with the
interests of France, which have not been discussed in this essay.
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Briefly stated, the present NATO command structure recognizes de facto
French control over the old Biscay Command area, even though the French
no longer officially participate in the NATO command. All NATO opera-
tions in the area, especially submarine operations, are coordinated with
the French national command. There may be a "gentlemen's agreement"
between NATO and France reserving the Biscay Command for France in the
event that France rejoins the NATO military command. These understand-
ings will take precedence over Spain's claim to a Biscay command. Spain
will not complain loudly, for it will find it easier to accept a posi-
tion subordinate to a British Admiral than to a Portuguese Admiral.
More controversial will be the relocation of the western boundary
of a Spanish Mediterranean command. One reason is the relationship
between the command boundary and the settlement of the Gibraltar question
as discussed in the preceding chapter. If Britain and Spain agree on a
settlement which places the Commander of the base at Gibraltar under the
NATO command of the Spanish Admiral at San Fernando, as has been recently
suggested, then both nations will lobby strongly for relocation of the
western boundary to facilitate this arrangement. Relocation of the boun-
dary will involve a concurrent relocation of the boundary between
SACLANT and SACEUR areas of responsibility. SACLANT strongly has
resisted similar initiatives when presented in the past, and it will be he
who will probably make the final determination on such a proposal. The
Defense Planning Council is unlikely to go against the recommendations
of SACLANT, and the personality of the person filling the position at
the time when the question is considered may be the most important single
variable in shaping the final boundary.
107

Nonetheless, a solution such as the one outlined above, while not
the Tiost effective militarily, will require the lowest level of political
concession from Spain and Portugal. It will provide each with the pres-




V. SPAIN, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
,
AND CENTRAL FRONT DEFEASE STRATEGY
A. OVERVIEW
At first glance, Spanish accession appears to offer NATO a possible
solution to a chronic problem, the need for a credible defense of the
Central Front. Spain will bring to NATO the fourth largest army in
Western Europe, and smaller but more modern naval and airforces. Even
more significant may be the added territorial depth which Spain will
bring to the theater. A rethinking of NATO defense strategy may be
required to incorporate these assets to best advantage.
Happily, Spain seems eager to find a role for its Armed Forces in
NATO. Seeking to defuse the potential for another coup attempt, the
government is anxious to find a meaningful international role for the
Armed Forces which will help divert the attention of the Army away from
internal politics. As Jose Pedro Perez Llorca, Spain's Foreign Minis-
ter, has said,
We've got to help those Armed Forces find a role whicn they
haven't had since the 19th century. We are not looking for wars,
Dut we have to change the pattern of an Army that had a colonial
and internal role (but) never really an (external) defense role.
[Ref. 170]
The Foreign Minister added that his government considers terrorism and
the Soviet threat to NATO's central front the greatest challenges to
European stability.
Given the coincidence of NATO's need, and the opportunity presented
by Spanish accession, a critical examination of how the two circumstances





present the background of NATO Central Front defense strategy, and
discuss the credibility of the strategy in tiie context of current
force levels. The final sections will ^resent alternative ways in
which Spanish accession could affect that strategy, and offer conclu-
sions on how the Alliance ultimately may incorporate Spain into plans
for the defense of Europe.
3. THE EVOLUTION OF NATO DEFENSE STRATEGY
The roots of NATO defense policy for the Central Front can be
traced back to the ./estern European Defense Organization (WEDO), the
planning body of the Western European Union (WEU ). Under WEU mandate,
this group had worked through 1943 on European defense planning proo-
lems and, when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, began
immediately to adapt its plans to the NATO framework. [Ref. 171]
The product .vnich the planning group produced included three
defense plans: a short term, a medium term, and a long term plan.
The snort term plan was responsive to the balance of forces as it was
believed to exist at the time; i.e., it presumed a superior Soviet
ground force which had the capability to overcome any resistance
offered by the few Allied divisions then in existence and advance
quickly to the Atlantic. The short term plan was essentially an
evacuation plan for the withdrawal of Allied forces from continental
Europe. When reinforced by newly mobilized divisions from the United
Kingdom and North America, these forces would form the nucleus for a
Normandy-type counteroffensive. The short term plan accepted the




The medium tern plan was intended to provide the allies with an
inoroved infrastructure and command organization which would allow
them to defend Europe without abandoning the continent in the event
of a Soviet attack. ,;hen the North Atlantic Treaty was signed,
Allied forces in Europe were organized for occupation, not defense.
"Jot only were the logistics support systems and types of equipment
necessary to support large scale ground operations not in place, but
Allied troops were widely dispersed in small and immobile units. The
medium term defense plan was designed to correct these deficiencies.
Realistically, through 1953 this was the plan which would have guided
the course of allied actions in an European war. According to Roger
Hilsman, the allied forces in Germany "would have dropped back to
positions on the Rhine without attempting to fight anything but skir-
mishes". [Ref. 172] With the ground forces at their disposal, and with
massive conventional bombing support from the American Air Force, the
Allies felt that they had a reasonable cnance to hold at the Rhine,
and planned to launch a successful counterattack following reinforcement.
The 12 divisions and 400 aircraft tnen available to NATO could not,
nowever, effectively meet even the modest objectives of the medium term
defense plan against an assault of the magnitude expected. The long
term plan offered an analysis of future force requirements for the
defense of Western Europe in case of a major Soviet attack; i.e., it
was a proposal for a future NATO force structure, rather than a strategy
for utilization of existing forces.
The three .VEDO plans were overtaken by events little more than a
year after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, when NATO began
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moving toward a new defensive strategy. The term "forward strategy" was
first officially used to describe .NATO plans for the defense of Western
Europe at the September 1950 meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The
concept was born in response to the Communist invasion of the rtepuolic
of Korea, wnich changed alestern perceptions of Soviet intentions and
the means which they would use to secure tneir goals. Lord Isrnay, the
first Secretary General of NATO, relates of this meeting:
. . . discussions were centered on a single problem: how to
defend the NATO area from an aggression similar to that which
had taken place in the Far East. . . . There was complete agree-
ment that a 'forward strategy' should be adopted in Europe . . .
in order to ensure the defense of all NATO European countries.
[Ref. 173]
The real roots of forward strategy are more involved than this simple
explanation implies. Korea provided the spur which prodded the Council
into action, but the weaknesses of the medium term plan had been apparent
much earlier.
Soviet possession of nuclear weapons made the successful completion
of a Normandy-type operation doubtful. There was no room for failure in
the concept of a defense along the Rhine. Should the Soviets succeed in
overcoming the Allied defenses and occupy continental Europe, the prob-
ability of forcibly ejecting them at some future time would be remote.
To block possible Soviet occupation, NATO needed more defensive forces
of all types, and more reserve forces to shore up the defenses and wage
a counteroffensive. The states which then comprised NATO had proven
during the Second World War that they were capable of supporting mili-
tary forces of the magnitude envisioned, but the economic and political
situation in postwar Europe dictated that they would not choose to do
so. Given the reality of this situation, some alternative means of
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strengthening NATO credibility was sought. The alternative conveniently
at hand was the rearmament of West Germany.
The leadership of the Federal Republic was eager to join in an
arrangement for the common defense of Europe. Chancellor Adenauer saw
such an arrangement as a way to move Germany further along the road from
occupation toward sovereignty. But he faced the problem of selling the
program to the nation: it was questionable whether the people would
support a plan which proposed immediate forfeit to occupation a territory
which included 30 percent of its population and 25 percent of its indus-
trial base. For that matter, the same could have been said of the nations
of Denmark and the Netherlands, both of whom would have been largely
forfeited under the medium term defense plan. A strategy was needed
which would make participation in the Alliance politically palatable
for West Germany, Denmark, and Holland. Forward strategy offered the
promise of achieving that result, even though the means to achieve it
were not yet available. Therefore, at the September 1950 meeting in
New York, the Council formally endorsed a strategy of forward defense,
and set in motion a study which would determine how best to implement
the strategy.
The results of that study were published in 1952 wnen the Council
met in Lisbon. Vast force level increases were proposed to ensure
repulsion of Soviet aggression. From 12 divisions and 400 aircraft,
NATO military might was to be expanded to 96 divisions and 4,000 air-
craft. The magnitude of the proposed increases proved to be more than
the member nations of NATO were willing to pay for, even though the
prospect of an Alliance with the Federal Republic of Germany hung in
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the balance. European statesmen cried that neither tneir economies nor
their electorates would support such a commitment. The Times called
such a force "the maximum amount of provocation with the minimum amount
of deterrent effect". [Ref. 174] Yet, it was becoming increasingly clear
that the accession of the Federal Republic was necessary if the Alliance
was to become a credible security guarantor of the West. Both German
manpower and German territory were essential to give iNATO some desperately
needed continental depth. NATO faced a great dliemma: the cost of
forward defense was greater than its members were willing to bear, yet
the concept of forward defense was politically sacrosanct to the Federal
Republic, without whose membership the credibility of the Alliance would
be weak.
A search was launched for a solution to this dilemma. If the conven-
tional forces required to support the strategy were not to be made avail-
able, another means of making forward defense credible had to be found.
The doctrine of "massive retaliation", as incorporated in NCS-162 and
presented publicly by American Secretary of State Dulles in January 1954,
offered the alternative sought. Dulles said that in case of aggression
the United States would "retaliate instantly, by means and at places of
our choosing". This policy allowed the U.S., and as a direct corollary
NATO, to "get and share more security at less cost". IRef. 175] Thus U.S.
nuclear might was substituted for conventional armed strength in Europe.
The implications were clear: If the Soviet Union chose to invade Western
Europe, U.S. strategic nuclear forces would react with devastating attacks
on the Soviet homeland. Linkage was created. Conventional force level
requirements could now be tailored to smaller objectives: deterring small
orobing actions, protecting against minor military incursions with limited
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objectives, and forcing the Soviets to commit a lary e enouyn attacK force
to <.iake their objectives clearly apparent, thereoy ensuring tnat taere
would be no reluctance to use U.S. strategic forces. This comDiridtion
of forward strategy and massive retaliation remained declaratory riATO
doctrine tnrougn 1967.
As the decade of the 1950' s drew to a close, nowever, tne credibility
and desirability of the massive retaliation portion of the doctrine came
under increasing scrutiny in the United States. Staging from forward
bases around tne world in tne early 1950' s, U.S. strategic bomoers had
oosed a far greater threat to the U.S.3.R. than any threat posed by the
Soviets to the United States. It was assumed that the soviet Union would
be forced to back down in any confrontation, rather than risk provoking
a nuclear attack by the United States. In the late 1 950 ' s however,
Sputnik and the "missile gap" caused many strategists to question the
supposed invulnerability of America. The total reliance of Western
defense policy on America's nuclear deterrent force, left U.S. Presi-
dents no middle ground on wnicn to take a stand in case of confrontation.
In any showdown with the Soviet Union, the choices were limited to oluff,
concession, or total nuclear war. None of tne choices seemed particu-
larly attractive.
Defusing the potential for large scale global nuclear conflict uecame
a major objective of the new American administration following tne 19o0
elections. With .Kennedy and McNamara taking the lead, the U.S. sought
to develop a strategy whicn could deal effectively with local aggression,
yet maintain a clear "firebreak" between "acceptable" conventional war-
fare and unacceptable nuclear warfare. Tne strategy of "flexiole
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response", wnich theoretically called for Western dominance at every
level of escalation, was the product of tne administration's search.
'Jnder tnis concept, aggression would be met with force in kind; the
response would be limited to the minimum required to repulse tne cnreat,
nothing more.
The economic costs of fully implementing this strategy were enormous.
The Alliance essentially was facing the same dilemma as in 19ti2, «nen
the member states proved unwilling to support the force levels required
to make Alliance defense strategy crediDle. The European members of
JATO strongly resisted the Kennedy initiative, accusing tne U.S. of
sacking out of its NATO nuclear commitment, and seeking to sever the
linkage between Europe and American nuclear forces. Jut Kennedy and
his successor, Lyndon Johnson, held firm. Under great American pressure,
a strategy of flexible response, still linked to forward defense, was
formally adopted by NATO in 1967. This combination remains the declared
strategy of NATO today.
To meet each potential threat with a response in kind, dominance at
ayery escalation level is required. But though it has been over 14 years
since the doctrine of flexible response was formally adopted Dy MATO,
the member nations of tne Alliance have snown little inclination to
matcn Soviet force level buildups in Europe witn similar quantitative
and qualitative improvements in their own forces. Instead, they have
chosen to rely on the threat of the first use of theater nuclear forces
to deter a Soviet attack, and presumably would rely on those same forces
to defend against such an attack if it should come. Intended originally
as a stopgap to redress a conventional force imbalance until NATO ground
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forces could be Duilt tv, theater nuclear forces nave become the permanent
cure-all for NATO inferiority in men, tanks, and artillery.
C. T.iE CREDIBILITY OF THE CURRENT STRATEGY
There are many problems with the credibility of tne tnreat of theater
nuclear weapons first use. First, tnere is the temptation for Soviet
nuclear preemption, wnich not only limits tne military value of .NATO's
tneater forces but makes several Alliance nations unwilling to consider
the acceptance of the weapons on their soil. Fearing, that the ooviets
will perceive the modernization of American intermediate nuclear forces
as a provocation, many of the same nations even are reluctant to discuss
weapons improvement, lest the Soviet temptation to preempt be increased.
Secondly, changes in the overall strategic nuclear balance appear
also to favor the Soviet Union. Clearly, by unleashing nuclear forces in
the European tneater, tne U.S. now risks immediate Soviet escalation to
a preemptive strategic attack on the continental United States. There
is great douot whether any American President would risk a nuclear attack
on tne United States in order to defend Europe.
In a speech in Brussels in 1979, Henry Kissinger uluntly told his
audience that "we must face the fact that it is absurd to base the
strategy of tne *est on the credioility of the threat of mutual suicide".
[Ref. 176] Some six years earlier, former Defense Secretary Packard
stated even more clearly tnat, in his opinion, "the United states would
not use its nuclear forces against tne Soviet Union short of a dire
threat to the survival of the United States". [Ref. 177J
In addition to the problems of credibility, the NATO decisionmaking
process can oe expected to be complicated further by Soviet efforts at
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deception, aimed at disguising true Objectives and prolonging Western
indecision. Therefore, in any case, it is not clear whether political
constraints within the democratic nations of tne Alliance would allow
WO to reach a militarily timely decision on the employment of the
7
weapons.
If the threat of theater nuclear weapons has been neutralized, what
then serves to deter Soviet aggression, and what would defend Europe
in the event of the failure of deterrence? Many believe the answer must
be that conventional forces must deter conventional attack, while
survivable intermediate nuclear forces are needed to deter a Soviet
theater preemption. Vet, owing to the reluctance of the mernoer nations
to bear the cost of conventional defense, NATO's ground forces remain
inadequate for that task.
The highly critical analysis of NATO defense capabilities presented
in the Nunn report [Ref. 178] is perhaps the Pest-known study detailing
these inadequacies. Comparison figures for 1980 show NATO force levels
on the Central Front to be 27 divisions, 7,000 tanks, and 2,250 tactical
aircraft, while Warsaw Pact forces include 46 divisions (26 Soviet),
19,500 tanks (12,500 Soviet), and 3,900 tactical aircraft (2,230 Soviet).
The Warsaw Pact forces also maintain a 2:1 advantage in active reserve
manpower. [Ref. 179]
There are studies which postulate that use of theater nuclear forces
will exacerbate rather tnan ameliorate the East-West manpower imbalance
A model developed for one such report shows that frontline forces will
For an excellent discussion of the weaknesses of NATO nuclear
strategy, see Ikle, Charles Fred, "NATO's 'First Nuclear Use': A deep-
ening Trap?", Strategic Review , Vol VIII, No. 1, Winter, 1980.
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be decimated quickly in a theater nuclear exchange, and that ultimate
victory will go to the side with the greater reserve forces. [Ref. 180]
In his book, Europe Without Defense , General Robert Close argues that,
given the current imbalance of forces in Europe, it would take a Soviet
offensive only 48 hours to reach the Rhine. He is hardly alone in his
concern. Other studies estimate one day to reach tne Weser River, and
as few as five days to occupy completely the Federal Republic and Low
Countries.
Concerns in West Germany mirror concerns elsewhere over the credi-
bility of NATO's defense strategy. From Die Zeit : "America would like
to stall as long as possible any NATO use of its nuclear force in defense
ow Western Europe." The result of such a lack of action would be a war
of attrition which "would be sure to devastate Western Europe in general,
and this country in particular." [Ref. 181]
At least some high-ranking military officers share concern, not only
for tne flexible response portion of NATO strategy, but for the credibility
of the forward defense portion as well. In a recent proposal for West
German ground force restructuring, Major General Jochen Loeser discussed
the weaknesses of forward defense, concluding that the second echelon of
Warsaw Pact forces would break the Weser-Lecn defense line, and quickly
overrun allied forces on the Central Front. [Ref. 182] Although the
article scrupulously avoided recommending a defense strategy which was
explicitly designed to concede territory to the aggressor, it is clear
in context that this is precisely what is required if the proposals are




Under present and foreseeable circumstances, it would be
impossible for NATO to wage ... a conflict without giving up
significant parts of Western territory. The stark fact is
that, in view of the political imperative of 'forward defense',
the limited depth of NATO territory as well as the vulnerability
of the Alliance's arms supplies, NATO could not resist a con-
certed Soviet conventional offensive. [Ref- 183]
D. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES AND THE IMPACT OF SPANISH ACCESSION
There are two possible ways in which Spanish accession might improve
the credibility of NATO's Central European defense posture. The first
would be if the addition of Spanish Armed Forces greatly altered the
balance of forces in the theater. A radical shift in favor of the west
could neutralize present Soviet advantages at the conventional level.
Unfortunately, this will not be the case. Even if a majority of Spain's
255,000 ground troops were committed to NATO's Central Front, they would
not dramatically alter the balance.
Owing to the present structure of the Spanish Army, the maximum
commitment which Spain could make is probably much less than 50 percent
of its Army. Most of the Army's manpower presently is concentrated in
the widely dispersed units of the Territorial Jefense Forces, and the
"Overseas Forces" stationed in the rialearics, Canary Islands, and North
African enclaves. The traditional mission of these units has been
internal security, and the defense of tne "balearic-viibraltar-Canary-
Axis" against attack from North Africa. They are ligntly armed, small,
and immobile. Mucn of their firepower is in fixed coastal artillery.
These units are not prepared to support NATO in the event of a general
conventional war. Those units which could possibly aid in NATO defense
are the units of the Immediate Intervention Force. This force is com-
posed of one armored, one mechanized, and one motorized division,
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supported by regimental size and smaller light artillery and engineer
units. The total force numbers about 40,000 men, and would be a welcome
contribution if offered to NATO, but radically short of wnat is required
to alter the military balance. [Ref. 184]
Increasing tne possible magnitude of the Spanisn contribution will
take both time and money. Time will be required to reorganize and
retrain the Territorial and Overseas Forces for the type of mission
which they might expect in a NATO scenario. The Spanisn Government
already has begun this task as part of its program to move the Army away
from domestic politics. The replacement of all members of the Spanish
Joint Chiefs in late fall 1931 was motivated in part by this oojective,
as was the union of the three services under a Joint Chief in 1977.
Changes in the seniority and command structures have had a similar
objective. Under the provisions of the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation, a combined Spanish-American staff has been working on
plans for joint exercises between the two nations in the Zone of Common
Interest, with one goal being the familiarization of Spanish Armed Forces
with Western operating procedures. Yet, in spite of the government's
intentions, the reorganization and retraining will take considerable
time, for there remains, especially in the Army, a strong core of senior
officers who look with disfavor on attempts to reform the service.
[Ref. 135]
An even more difficult problem will be financing the equipment needed
to upgrade Spain's forces to NATO standards. The Spanish government has
budgeted significant increases in defense spending through 1933. The
sharpest rise in spending will be for investment in new equipment, and
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for maintenance and readiness. The government target for defense expen-
ditures is three percent of SNP. [Ref. 136] But much of the increase is
being consumed by major item acquisition. The Spanish Navy has a major
ship construction program underway, and the Air Force is negotiating to
buy up to 176 American F-16 aircraft. There will not be sufficient pro-
curement funds remaining to upgrade the Army rapidly.
With the defense budgets of other NATO nations already stretched,
and with Portugal, Greece, and Turkey competing for military assistance
funds, it is unlikely that NATO will help subsidize the modernization
program to any great degree. Other factors which may limit Spain's
ability to accelerate military procurement plans include domestic resist-
ance to higher defense spending in the context of the nation's overall
economic downturn, and as the military is professionalized, pressure will
increase for higher military pay to compensate for the loss of income
from second jobs (called moonlighting by U.S. servicemen). Higher pay
demands will compete with procurement for military budget funds.
There is also an important question regarding the type and magnitude
of force commitment Spain would choose to make even if conditions out-
lined above did not exist. Although the government is anxious to find
an international role for the Army, the role envisioned may not include
foreign basing. At present in Spain there is little domestic support
for foreign basing, and the government has gone out of its way during
the campaign for accession to stress that no commitment automatically is
implied by NATO membership. Asked by ABC if there were any plans to
deploy Spanish troops in Europe, Foreign Minister Perez Llorca stated:
In principle, there are no plans for this. However we
could have troops 'assigned' to the Federal Republic of Germany.
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In other words, troops ready for transportation to a theater of
operations in Germany or Italy, the equipment and training of
wnom would be a wonderful task for the Army in which we would
be assisted by all the Atlantic Alliance countries, out there
are no plans to deploy troops outside national territory on a
national basis. [Ref. 187]
It is too early to tell whether the government position will change
after the accession process is complete, but given the precarious posi-
tion of the UC3 government, it is not unlikely tnat PSOE objections
would block any foreign troop deployments proposed in the future. If
Spain's commitment takes the form described by Perez Llorca, a commit-
ment similar in form to Portugal's, then its forces would contribute
to the credibility of NATO defenses to a somewhat lesser degree than if
they were predeployed to their assigned positions. In any case, the
magnitude of Spanish commitment in tne foreseeable future will not be
sufficient to alter the balance of forces significantly, nor greatly
improve the credibility of NATO defense in the theater.
The second way in which Spain might improve the credibility of NATO
defense posture would be if Spain offered the Alliance other tangible
assets on which an acceptable alternate strategy could be constructed.
Antonio Snachez-Gi jon, author of the book Espana en la OTAN (Spain in
NATO) and a recognized authority on Spanish defense, alluded to a pos-
sible Spanish role in an alternate strategy in a 1979 article for
NATO's Fifteen Nations :
The incipient analysis which is carried out in Spain with a
view to eventual integration into NATO has recently been stimu-
lated by observations on the value of the Iberian Peninsula as
a strategic bastion, in case of a retreat of the NATO forces
provoked by an overwhelming Soviet attack on the Central Front.
Observations in that sense formulated by Admiral iloorer (former
U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs) and the Portuguese Minister
of Defense . . . were commented on in the Spanish press last
January. In his assessment of the strategic importance of the
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Peninsula as a 'single entity' behind the Pyrenees which could
serve as a oastion for an European counterattack, the ideas of
the Portuguese Minister directly affect Spain. . . . There is
no doubt that the new Portuguese concept, already unfolded,
eventually united with Spanish perception of the strategic
interests of that country as part of the Atlantic Alliance,
would considerably help to strengthen western security in
general, and the defense of the peninsular nations in parti-
cular. [Ref. 188]
Spain does, in fact, offer two assets to NATO which would make the
construction of such a strategy feasible. Those assets are territory
and ports. The area of continental Spain is 195,000 square miles, corn-
Dared to 680,000 square miles for all the other continental NATO states
combined, and 383,000 square miles for the nations which face the Central
Front. Spanish accession would increase by 50 percent the territory
available to Central Front commanders for maneuver. That territory is
imminently defensible. It is cut off from the rest of Europe by the
Pyrenees mountain range, through which only one major highway, five
smaller secondary roads, and four railways pass. The interior of Spain
is also mountainous. 'Jext to Switzerland, Spain is the most mountainous
state in Europe. Whereas it has been estimated that it would require a
force of 100 divisions to defend the broad central plain of uerrnany against
Soviet attack [Ref. 189], the mountain passes of the Pyrenees could ce
secured by a force many times smaller.
Complementing this territorial sanctuary are Spanish port facilities
which would allow allied reinforcements from outside of Europe to be
offloaded en masse for the staging of a counteroffensive. Major Spanisn
ports include Bilbao on the Bay of Biscay, Cadiz on tne Atlantic side of
Gibraltar, and Valencia and Barcelona on the Mediterranean. Bilbao is
significant for its tanker berthing facility, which can accommodate
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ships of up to 500,000 DWT. , and for its total berthing footage, which
is significantly greater than any other Atlantic port soutn of the
English Channel with the exception of Le Havre. [Ref. 190]
NATO's hope for a credible defense lies in the ability to get
American reinforcements into the battle for the Central Front, and
nearly all of those reinforcements would have to come to Europe oy
sea. Airlift would be able to handle only tne first two and one-tr.ird
divisions, for which the Prepositioned Overseas Materiel Configured
to Unit Set (POMCUS) material is already on nand in theater. The
remaining ten divisions slated for NATO reinforcement, plus any reserve
and newly established divisions, would have to travel by sea with tneir
equipment. The first equipment convoy could not be expected to reacn
Europe before 0+32, while the first division size troop convoy would
not arrive before Q+70. [Ref. 191] ,Jhen tne convoys reached Europe,
they might find no place to disembark north of the Pyrenees if estimates
prove true that the Soviets can occupy quickly botn Germany and tne
Low Countries where all of the major port facilities are located.
Britisn ports, wnich might still be under NATO control, are well within
range of Soviet bombers, and the air defenses of the United Kingdom
have been cited as inadequate. [Ref. 192] Staging through British
ports also would require an ampiiibious operation at the outset of a
counteroffensive, an undesirable idea for reasons previously discussed.
Iberian ports might be the only choices for points of debarkation.
There would be some disadvantages to the use of Iberian ports.
For one, the yery isolation wnich makes Spain so defensible means that
transfer of men and supplies north of the Pyrenees will be similarly
restricted to a few vulnerable routes. There also is the problem of
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the railroads. Spanish railways are of a different guage than standard
European railways, and all supplies traveling by rail would have to be
offloaded from Spanish trains and reloaded for transfer further north.
Distances between Spain and Central Europe are great. From Barcelona to
Frankfurt is 1300 km. If one assumes an average rail speed of advance
of 32 kph [Ref. 193], then it would take 41 hours for each supply train
to reach a nominal destination in Germany. There also would be tne M ues-
tion of France's status in the war, and whether NATO supplies could pass
freely through France.
Finally, Iberia's credibility as a staging area would have to be
protected with large investments in air defenses (those presently in
place in Spain look southward into the Meaiterranean rattier than toward
Europe), civil defense, and possibly ballistic missile defenses, tfut
from the . 1AT0 standpoint, perhaps tne greatest limitation to tne use of
S^anisn ports is tnat to plan meaningful ly for such a contingency means
admitting that the strategy of forward defense might not oe workable.
Although this possibility is discussed widely, a formal policy position
which acknowledged the probability could be too expensive politically
for the Alliance.
The advantages of depth and sanctuary which Spain brings to NATO
are not newly recognized by military strategists. In his article on
early NATO strategy, Roger Hilsman mentions twice the role wnich Spain
might play in the earliest NATO defense plans. Regarding the short
term plan, which was an emergency evacuation plan, Hilsman alludes to:
... a desperate hope--which was never (formally) expressed
—
that Franco might let the Allied troops pass through Spain or
even stand with them in an attempt to hold at the Pyrenees.
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Even more striking is his discussion of the medium tern plan, which
called for the defense of Europe at positions behind tiie Rhine:
. . .
during the discussions . . . one idea was paramount,
though never openly expressed. Each of the participants . . .
wanted a sector which would permit retreat. This was not
cowardice, but merely prudence. In a sector permitting room
to maneuver, one could hope to live to fight another day. . . .
The center position was best; the force here could hope to
retreat into France and perhaps make a stand farther back,
if necessary, at the Pyrenees. [Ref . 194]
Although Hilsman does not cite specific references for these points,
he does state that much of his material, presumably including these
thoughts, was gained through interviews with key .NATO military and civi-
lian leaders. Is the situation in Europe today significantly different
than it was in ,1ay 1950 in terms of the balance of forces on the Central
Front? Today, theater nuclear weapons on each side tend to cancel out
the credibility of a nuclear defense. In 1950, 12 Allied divisions faced
22 Soviet divisions. Today, 27 Allied divisions face 46 Warsaw Pact div-
isions. Although the size and firepower of tne divisions have changed,
the proportional balance remains roughly the same. If MTO strategy in
1950 was prudently considering a defense along the Pyrenees, should not
such a strategy also be considered today?
E. CONCLUSIONS
From a purely military perspective, NATO strategists should seriously
consider an alternative strategy for the defense of Central Europe.
The credibility of a defense based on forward strategy is widely con-
sidered to be questionable. Spanish accession will do nothing to make
that strategy more credible, but will open new options for an alterna-
tive strategy. Regardless of whether a general war in Europe were
fought with conventional or nuclear weapons, the side which most
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effectively mobilizes and deploys its reserves nay end up the victor.
The Soviet Union, with its shorter, overland, interior lines of com-
munication, has a decided advantage over NATO in this respect. This
advantage could be neutralized, however, by a NATO strategy for a
collapsing defense along the Central Front, with an ultimate fallback
oosition at the Dyrenees. A planned and orderly withdrawal to the
Pyrenees would ensure the survival of sufficient Allied forces to hold
Iberia against superior Soviet forces until reinforcements from North
America could be deployed. Possession of Iberia as a staging area would
allow NATO to avoid a Normandy- type operation at the beginning of the
counteroffensive.
Yet strategic military considerations have never been dominant in
the shaping of NATO policy. As a free association of sovereign demo-
cratic states, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization must be sensitive
to the political concerns of member nations. The birth of the strategy
of forward defense was, after all, prompted by political considerations.
Those considerations remain as important today as they were in September
1950.
The effective defense of Western Europe is dependent on the active
participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Nortn Atlantic
Alliance. The constituency of that democracy would not tolerate support
of an organization which by plan adopted a strategy to forfeit a
significant Dart of their population and territory to occupying forces.
In correspondence with the author, Dr. Manfred von Nordheim of the
Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, the research institute of West Germany's
Christian Democratic Union, the issue has been put in perspective:
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It is utterly unthinkable that the Federal Republic of Germany
would consider abandoning the strategy of Forward Defense. . . .
I am sure tnat the question of Jest Germany's continued member-
ship in NATO would be at risk if NATO would seriously contemplate
the strategy of an in-depth defense. [Ref. 195]
The accession of Spain into NATO will, therefore, have no immediate
effect on NATO strategy for the defense of Central Europe. NATO's pre-
sent psychological stalemate concerning change in strategy will continue.
It is widely suspected that the strategy of forward defense, coupled to
flexible response, is no longer (if it ever was) a viable one for the
defense of Europe given the existing balance of forces, ret Europeans,
and Americans to a lesser extent, have been so indoctrinated into the
myth of insuperable Soviet land power that they refuse to develop forces
adequate to pursue their chosen strategy, despite the fact that they
would be able to do so with less cost in terms of percentage of manpower
and 3NP than the Soviets.
Further, existing political realities will not permit any formal
deoate on alternative strategies which would require a smaller commit-
ment for a higher chance of success. Although political considerations
will continue to dominate the formation of formal policy, pragmatic mili-
tary strategists will find reasons to develop certain plans for pursuing
other options in limited ways. Operation orders will be written which
will include contingency plans for resupply through Spanish ports. Mili-
tary studies of the strategic terrain of the Iberian peninsula will be
conducted, and the results included in NATO files. More funds will be
allocated for improvement of port facilities and the transportation
infrastructure in Iberia. Joint exercises will be held between land
and air forces of Spain and other NATO countries. Some NATO war materials
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may be stockpiled in Spain. Perhaps twenty years from now a retired NATO
general will give an interview in which he alludes to unspoken plans for
a contingency defense of Europe along the Pyrenees. But none of this
will be spoken of openly or formally within the North Atlantic Council
or the Defense Planning Council.
Yet, Spanisn accession will have a more subtle effect on the crediDi-
lity of the NATO security guarantee. One of the traditional strong points
of Western military organizations has been the initiative of the leader-
ship and the ability to improvise. With the minimum of advance planning
outlined above, it is quite plausible that a defense at the Pyrenees
could be extemporaneously executed in the event that forward defense
positions proved untenable. This possibility alone will be sufficient
to cause the Soviet Union additional uncertainty regarding the success
of any aggressive move into Western Europe. Thus Spain's accession will
add immediately to the credibility of NATO's deterrent, if not to its
defense, along the Central Front.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF THE BILATERAL ISSUES
A. WHY NO GREAT DE3ATE?
Given the magnitude of the bilateral issues discussed in the preced-
ing chapters, the Spanish accession process might have been expected to
proceed quite slowly. Instead, it is approaching completion quite
rapidly. The Soviet Union tried to slow the process through direct
pressure on Spain, through pressure on Alliance members, and through
interference in Spanish politics, but failed. Long-standing problems
with Britain concerning settlement of the Gibraltar issue remain unre-
solved, yet neither Spain nor Britain attempted to use the accession
question to gain leverage on the Gibraltar issue during the application
debate in Spain or the ratification debate in Britain. Portuguese and
Spanish pride did not clash during the accession process. The dialogue
between the two nations concerning the future role of Spain in the
Alliance has, in fact, been surprisingly conciliatory. The Federal
Republic of Germany has remained one of Spain's strongest supporters
within the Alliance despite Soviet pressure and urging from other
European Socialists to show solidarity with the PSOE in its opposition
to NATO membership. All in all, the accession process has proceeded
remarkably smoothly.
Although Spanish membership offers many strategic advantages for
the Alliance, it has not been recognition of these advantages which
has made the process so smooth. The advantages are not new; Spain's
strategic contribution to NATO in 1982 is roughly the same as it
would have been in 1949. flor is recognition of the advantages new;
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the United States argued from the beginning that Spain's strategic
importance was more significant to NATO than its form of government,
and that Spain should be a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization. Failing to persuade its European allies, the U.S. consummated
its own bilateral base rights agreement with Spain in 1953. Though they
recognized the importance of this agreement to Western defense, NATO's
Northern European states firmly continued to resist repeated American
proposals for Spanish accession over a 30-year period. There have oeen
no strategic developments during that time which have caused the Alliance
suddenly to reevaluate the potential Spanish contribution to NATO.
In spite of the fact that NATO is primarily a security community,
strategic issues have not determined the pace of the Spanish accession
process. Instead, the concern which has preempted all other issues has
been the preservation of democracy in Spain. This concern alone has
produced an overwhelming consensus within the Alliance in favor of
Spanish accession. Prior to the February 1981 coup attempt, the
instability of the democracy was considered a liability in the process.
Several member states feared a return to authoritarian rule in Spain.
They argued that the Alliance should not proceed too quickly with the
association, but should wait until the strength of the democracy had
proven itself. Following the coup attempt, however, this perspective
changed radically. The Spanish Government argued that membership in
NATO would contribute to the consolidation of democracy in Spain,
and Alliance members accepted this argument. The question became not
'Can Spanish democracy prove strong enough to survive?" but "Can NATO
membership help Spanish democracy survive?"
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One of Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo' s first steps in the domestic
accession campaign was to hurry to Bonn seeking reassurances of German
support. Certain Spanish newspapers had reported tnat following the coup
attempt, support for Spanish entry was cooling throughout Europe. Recog-
nizing that the Cortes would not vote favorably on the government's
request to make application for NATO membership if there was any chance
the application would be rejected, Calvo-Sotelo sought to discredit
these reports quickly. Arguing in Bonn that the coup attempt underscored
Spain's need to move quickly toward accession, Calvo-Sotelo asked for
Chancellor Schmidt's support. He was not disappointed. At a joint
press conference, Schmidt declared that the Federal Republic "would come
out firmly in favor of it (accession) the moment Spain officially
declares its position". [Ref. 196] Many of NATO's other leaaers followed
suit. By May, Secretary General Luns was able to announce that all
members of the North Atlantic Council would welcome Spain's application.
Bilateral issues were tabled. Final settlement of the Gibraltar
question was postponed until after accession. Spain and Portugal dropped
demands for preconditions regarding reorganization of the NATO command
structure. Discussion of the details of a future role for the Spanisn
Army was avoided while the debate was in progress.
The accession process timetable was determined by the schedule of
meetings of the North Atlantic Council. Each of the states involved
in the process, including Spain, clearly understood the limitations
imposed by the schedule. The unwritten timetable became the driving
engine of the accession process. The limiting date was the annual
meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial level, which
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is held each May. If the formal process of accession were not completed
before May 1933, Spain would have to wait another full year to be
welcomed into the Alliance. The supporters of accession argued that
this was too long.
To allow sufficient time for all members to ratify an invitation
before the May 1982 meeting, Spain had to submit its application for
membership prior to the December 1981 Ambassadorial level Council
meeting. Thus the Calvo-Sotelo government had to complete the domestic
popular and parliamentary debates on the accession question prior to
December. The requirement to telescope the entire process into the
short time available effectively preempted debate on all bilateral
international political issues, which became seemingly peripheral as
they were subordinated to the imperative for preserving democracy in
Spain.
This does not mean that the bilateral issues were forgotten. On
the contrary, it is likely that once formal ratification of Spanish
membership is completed, debate on each of the issues will De reopened.
Although they were unexpectedly preempted during the accession process,
they will surface again, with potentially significant effects on
Alliance cohesion.
B. BILATERAL ISSUES AND ALLIANCE COHESION
1 . Spain and the Soviet Union
Of the four bilateral relationships discussed in this thesis,
the Soviet-Spanish relationship will have the least long term signifi-
cance for Alliance cohesion. Soviet failure to create greater contro-
versy over the accession question in Western Europe was a reflection
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of the general deterioration of Western interest in detente during
the 1979-1981 period. Success (whether or not it can be attributed
to Soviet initiatives) on the nuclear arms issue in Spain was a reflec-
tion of increasing concern throughout Europe over the reliance of NATO
strategy on nuclear deterrence and defense coupled with tne realization
that, if deterrence were to fail, the continent could become a nuclear
battleground in a Soviet-American war. Once Spanish integration into
NATO is complete, Soviet interest in Spain will be no greater than in
other Alliance states, and Soviet initiatives intended to influence
developments in Spain will be only part of broader efforts to influence
liberal European thought in general. The Soviet-Spanish relationship
will become merely another facet of the East-West relationship.
Support for regional movements in Spain will not give the Soviets
additional leverage over the Spanish Government. In fact, it may work
to the advantage of right-of-center politicians, who may continue to
use Soviet interference to increase public awareness of the Soviet
threat, and thus increase public support for a Western-oriented instead
of a neutral position in international relations. Regional autonomy
movements in Spain date from before the 15th century. They are mani-
festly nationalistic. They are unrelated to the East-West struggle and
the Soviets will find that, like certain Middle-East states, the
regional factions will accept Soviet aid when it suits their purpose,
but will not accept lingering Soviet influence.
Even if failure to deal successfully with regional movements
should lead to a change in government in Spain, the Soviets may find
a new government no more responsive to Soviet influence than the
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present government. Both the PSOE and the PCE have strongly rejected
Soviet interference in Spain's internal affairs. If the Spanish
electorate becomes convinced of Soviet complicity in terrorist acti-
vities, it is \/ery possible that the PSOE and even the PCE may, like
the Italian Communist Party, come to support Spanish membership in
NATO as a means of preserving the balance of power in Europe and check-
ing Soviet hegemony. This would weaken Soviet influence in Spain still
further.
2. Spain, the Federal Republic, and Central Front Strategy
By itself, the question of a Spanish role in NATO strategy for
the defense of the Central Front is not now, and will not become, a
major issue. Spain cannot provide NATO with sufficient additional
conventional forces to make the strategy of forward defense credible,
yet the political commitment of the Federal Republic of Germany to the
forward defense strategy makes any proposal for an alternative strategy
a non-issue. Spanish accession virtually will have no effect on Central
Front defense strategy planning.
A major associated issue which will have continuing importance
within NATO, however, is the need to provide the Spanish Army with a
meaningful role in Alliance defense plans. Leaders of the Alliance
states are convinced, like the Spanish government, that such a role
must be found if Spain's Armed Forces are to assume an external defense
perspective. They will support Spanish efforts to identify such a
role for the same reasons that they have supported acceleration of
the accession process. The problem will require an imaginative solu-
tion. It will not be easy to redirect Army attention away from the
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traditional internal security and Southern Front perspectives toward
Europe. Portuguese democracy faced a similar but less severe problem
in 1975. The commitment of a brigade to Southern Europe was the price
whicn the Portuguese government willingly paid for NATO assistance in
upgrading the equipment and training of its Army. Spain's Army is much
larger and much more conservative than Portugal's was in 1975. Funds
for military assistance are less available and competition among NATO's
less developed nations for such funds is greater. Without the promise
of upgraded equipment as an incentive, Spain's military leaders will
see little serious reason to become concerned with the defense of the
Italian Alps or the Northern German plains.
NATO and Spain will have to find alternative incentives, which
could take the form of ranking positions on various NATO staffs, or
concessions regarding NATO defense commitments for the Spanish enclaves
in North Africa. In spite of the Spanish Government's efforts to reform
and upgrade its Armed Forces, it will take at least a decade to complete
the Army's transition to its new role.
3. Spain, Britain, and Gibraltar
More important to NATO over the long term will be the ultimate
resolution of the Gibraltar question. As discussed in Chapter III,
the triangular relationship in that situation makes it virtually impos-
sible to identify a solution which is satisfactory to all three of the
involved parties. The intransigence of the Gibraltarian population
and of the Spanish conservative right further exacerbates the situation.
The issue cannot help but trouble NATO now and in the future, for the
status of the former colony is definitely in transition, although any
change in the situation can only be temporary and "satisficir j".
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If the North Atlantic Council choses to reject a role in the
administration of Gibraltar, there is a real possibility that further
negotiations will end in stalemate, creating a rift between Spain and
Britain. If the Council chooses to accept a role in the temporary
administration of the peninsula it will be accepting a large share of
the burden for a final settlement of the issue. The only hope of a
permanently acceptable solution lies in the hope that over time tne
3ibraltarians will soften their resistance to Spanish sovereignty.
At best, that is a distant hope. At worst, it might never come about.
In any case, the issue is likely to be a constant source of friction
within the Alliance for many years to come.
4. Spain and Portugal
The relationship with the most significant long term implica-
tions for NATO cohesion will be the Portuguese-Spanish relationship.
Alliance politicians will need to be continually sensitive to the
subtleties of this relationship. To characterize the relationship as
similar to the Greek-Turkish relationship would be excessive. No one
would suggest that Spain is Portugal's greatest enemy, yet there are
some parallels. Distrust and animosity are not elements of the rela-
tionship as they are in the Eastern Mediterranean, but uneasiness and
sensitivity are terms that accurately describe the situation.
Resolution of the command reorganization question will not end
the problem. There always will be other decisions facing NATO where
the prestige and pride of two nations will be involved, and the poten-
tial will be high for unintentional or unavoidable offense to one or
the other. For example, Portugal fears that Spanish competition for
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military assistance may jeopardize NATO's commitment to upgrade its
Armed Forces. Like the Spanish, the Portuguese feel that the stability
of their democracy is linked to maintenance of high morale in the
military. Demoralization in the Army was widespread prior to the 1974
coup as a result of a succession of colonial defeats. It only has
been recently that the Council of the Revolution has placed most of its
authority in the hands of the elected government. NATO aid is there-
fore viewed as essential to the consolidation of democracy. [Ref. 197]
The Spanish face an identical problem, and the needs of both nations are
undeniably legitimate. Yet with funds for assistance limited, some hard
choices face NATO defense planners. The decisions are bound to offend
one or both of the Iberian states.
There are other aspects of the relationship which tend to bind
the two states together, however. The most important of these is the
mutual support for democracy which each state provides to the other.
Just as the dictatorships of Salazar and Franco tended to be mutually
supportive, so too are the present democratic governments. The comments
of Portuguese defense analyst Alvaro Vasconcelos, previously quoted in
Chapter IV, are representative of the Portuguese viewpoint:
The accession of Spain to the Alliance is, from the Portuguese
point of view, both desirable and necessary. First, because NATO
will thereby be reinforced, which is in the interest of Portugal.
Secondly, because of the bearing that accession may have on the
consolidation of the democracy in Spain. Nothing would be more
harmful to Portugal than a new dictatorship in Spain
,
with a
consequent situation of instability along the common border.
°
[Ref. 198]
8The reference to "instability along the common border" recalls the
sanctuary given to the militant supporters of the ousted Caetano regime
by Franco in 1974 and 1975.
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Should the Portuguese and Spanish agree to construct a combined
staff for coordination of the defense of Iberia, over time this also
will help to improve relations and create understanding between the two.
Despite the negative aspects of the relationship which will require the
attention of NATO leaders, the positive aspects which bind the two
together will prove stronger in time.
5. Interlocking Relationships
Bilateral relationships cannot be isolated from the complex
miltilateral relationships in which all Alliance members participate.
The interaction between the resolution of the Gibraltar problem and the
development of a new maritime command structure within NATO offers one
illustration of interaction. Any changes to the existing structure will
involve concessions or opportunities for each of the nations affected.
For example, should the western boundary of SACEUR's maritime command be
extended into the Gulf of Cadiz to accomodate the Spanish and British,
some form of compensation might be demanded by the Portuguese. This
could come in the form of increased pressure to incorporate the Azores
within the Iberian Atlantic Command, request for preferential allocation
of military assistance aid, demands for greater infrastructure develop-
ment support in Portugal, or even demands for additional compensation
from the United States in return for use of Portuguese military facili-
ties. Redirection of funds to meet these demands would require other
concessions by those who are competing for the same assets.
The question of NATO commitment to the defense of Spain's North
African enclaves, which the Alliance would prefer to avoid, is closely
linked to the bilateral relationships. Already discussed is the
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possibility that Spain's military may put pressure on the government
to demand NATO participation in the defense of the enclaves as a quid pro
quo for Spanish Army commitments in Southern or Western Europe. The
Gibraltar problem also is relevant, for there is a strong parallel
between Spain's claim to Gibraltar and the Moroccan claim to Mel ilia,
Ceuta, and the smaller enclaves. Resolution of the Gibraltar question
in favor of Spain could set a precedent which the Moroccans would insist
be followed in North Africa. NATO involvement in Gibraltar could place
the Alliance in a position which jeopardizes its relations with Morocco.
As noted previously, Soviet initiatives in Spain will mirror
broader initiatives throughout Europe aimed at influencing public opinion
and government decisionmaking.
C. INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES
Two interpretations are common regarding NATO's failure to achieve a
unanimous consensus on every foreign policy issue. Some maintain that
lack of cohesion within the Alliance demonstrates the fragility of NATO.
NATO is seen as constantly on the verge of disintegration, lacking in
effectiveness, and unable to meet its commitments. If one sees the
Alliance in this light, the additional complications introduced into
the complex multilateral relations of the Alliance by Spanish accession
could appear as an intolerable burden upon NATO.
On the other hand, some stress the continued survival of NATO des-
pite the many complex issues which divide its members as evidence of the
strength and vitality of the Alliance. The members' ability to manage
differences without destroying the effective performance of the security
pact is seen as a great achievement, evidence that the underlying ties
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which bind the states together are stronger than the disputes which
sometimes receive more current attention. From this perspective, the
issues raised by Spanish accession need not be particularly trouble-
9
some.
The latter viewpoint is closer to the truth. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization has survived much more difficult confrontations.
Soviet influence with the Basque separatist ETA is mirrored by a
similar Soviet association with the militant element of the Irish
Republican Army and, to a lesser degree, with a separatist movement in
Corsica which troubles France. Neither of these associations has
degraded NATO effectiveness or support in the countries affected.
The relationship between Portugal and Spain has a parallel in the
relationship between France and the United States. In both cases a
state which has been an historical equal but is at present clearly
inferior strategically seeks to avoid submerging its identity in that
of the currently stronger ally. French pride and nationalism ultimately
led to that nation's withdrawal from the NATO command structure, a situa-
tion which NATO would surely not desire to see repeated in the Portuguese
case. Yet NATO survived in spite of French withdrawal. The withdrawal
of Portugal's limited forces would be a much less severe blow to the
Alliance than the withdrawal of French forces.
In any case, Portuguese incentive for withdrawal is much lower than
French, for withdrawal would actually decrease rather than increase the
9For a discussion of these two perspectives, see van Campen, S.I. P.,
"NATO: A Balance Sheet After Thirty Years," Qrbis , v. 23, no. 2, pp.
261-62 and 264-67, Summer 1979
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nation's prestige relative to Spain in the Western community. Portugal
cannot dream of becoming the focal point of a third power center between
the u.S. and the Soviet Union as France hoped to become. Portugal would
lose through withdrawal, while NATO, though weakened, could survive. It
is unlikely that Portugal would consider withdrawing from the Alliance
as a result of friction with Spain.
Although a dispute between two member states over sovereignty in a
former colonial possession will be new to NATO experience, the trauma
of the postcolonial period for several Alliance members, especially
France and Portugal, far exceeds the trauma of the Gibraltar question.
Both Spain and Britain sincerely are seeking a solution to the problem.
The Gibral tarians, although intransigent and a likely future irritant
in Alliance relations, are not significant enough to cause a serious break
in the Alliance. Just as Britain was able to force the Peliza government
in Gibraltar to tone down its integration rhetoric during the reconcili-
ation process, so will it be able to keep future friction at a manage-
able level while a solution is evolving.
When viewed from an historical perspective, the bilateral issues
surrounding Spanish accession are not traumatic enough to threaten the
stability of NATO. Undoubtedly they will cause diplomatic concern in
Europe and America from time to time, but the problems will not be
overwhelming. Even now the issues are eclipsed by more important
questions surrounding intermediate nuclear weapons policy and the
events in Poland. In the long term, the problems which Spain brings




VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW
Spain is moving steadily toward a position of full participation
in the community of Western democratic nations. Accession to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, which could come as early as April 1982,
will be a major milestone in that process. The North Atlantic Council
has voted to extend a membership invitation to Spain; formal ratifica-
tion of the invitation by NATO's 15 member states is the only stage of
the accession process not yet complete.
The completion of the process will be a diplomatic victory for the
majority Union del Centro Democratica Party. The party of Prime Minis-
ter Calvo-Sotelo has staked a great deal of its prestige on the NATO
question, and clearly expects too that its control of the government
will be strengthened when membership is finally secured. Yet the acces-
sion process has not proceeded without difficulty, for Spain's move away
from isolation has brought it into conflict with the interests of seve-
ral other nations. This thesis has focused on four bilateral relation-
ships where conflicts of interest have arisen, attempting to show how
each of the relationships has affected the accession process, and how
it may affect Alliance cohesion in the future.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
Chapter II discusses the relationship between Spain and the Soviet
Union with regard to the accession process. It examines the way in
which Soviet interests were affected by Spain's move toward NATO and
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reviews Soviet attempts to hinder the process of accession through
direct influence of the Spanish Government, through pressure on the
members of the Alliance, and through interference in the domestic
Spanish political process.
Soviet efforts to influence the process have failed. The European
community has been indifferent to Soviet arguments that the balance
of power will be adversely affected by Spanish accession, or that Span-
ish membership in the Alliance will mark the beginning of a new period
of hostility and the end of detente. The Soviet position has been
eroded by a general deterioration of Western interest in detente owing
to events in Afghanistan and Poland during tne period of the accession
debate. Direct Soviet attempts to influence the Spanish Government iiave
been even less successful. The government was able to take advantage of
popular reaction against Soviet interference in Spanish affairs by turn-
ing Communist rhetoric back against domestic opponents of NATO membership
However, the domestic political process in Spain has produced some
developments more pleasing to the Soviets. Most significant was the UCD
government promise to prohibit the deployment or storage of nuclear
weapons on Spanish soil. There also was a strong parallel between
Soviet anti-flATO propaganda and the anti-bloc positions of the Spanish
Socialist Worker's Party and the Spanish Communist Party. But the
degree to which Soviet initiatives were responsible for these develop-
ments clearly was limited. The anti-nuclear position taken by Spanish
liberals merely reflected a similar trend in liberal thought through-
out Europe, and the anti-bloc positions of the PSOE and PCE were
arrived at independently rather than as a function of Soviet influence.
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The only possible leverage remaining to the Soviets revolves around
support for Spanish separatist movements. If the Calvo-Sotelo govern-
ment is able to weather any crisis which might be precipitated by
terrorist activity until the process of accession is complete, even
this avenue for influence will be closed. The Soviets will find that,
even if the UCD government falls at a later time, a PSOE government
will be no more receptive to Soviet overtures than the current UCl)
government. Soviet opportunities for disruption of NATO cohesion
through Spain will therefore not be particularly troublesome to the
Alliance.
Chapter III discusses the question of sovereignty over Gibraltar.
In April 1930, it appeared that the nearly three century-old dispute
might be nearing resolution as the British and Spanish Governments
jointly announced the Lisbon Accords for the reopening of the border
between Spain and Gibraltar. Yet there was no further progress follow-
ing the announcement of the Accords, and the border remained sealed.
It appeared that the intransigence of the conservative Spanish right
might destroy the progress which had been made, and drive a wedge
between Spain and Britain, threatening Spanish accession to NATO. Yet
in the last few months of 1981, signs of progress again appeared.
April 20, 1982, was agreed upon as a firm date for the reopening of
the border.
This chapter reviews the history of the dispute, explaining the
interests and arguments of each of the parties affected, and discussing
what has happened to make progress on the issue possible after so long
a stalemate. Finally, it presents the options which have been considered
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for possible resolution of the conflict and discusses how NATO might
be involved in a final solution.
The solution currently being considered revolves around use of the
NATO command structure as a framework for an interim solution accept-
able to all parties. The critical question for NATO to consider is the
ultimate formulation of a more permanent solution. The Alliance should
be very cautious about assuming too great a share of that responsibi-
lity, for there is no quick solution to the problem. Only over time
can Spain, Britain, and NATO hope that an acceptable solution will
evolve. In the meantime, NATO cohesion will be served best by limiting
NATO involvement.
Chapter IV discusses the historic relationship between Spain and
Portugal. The Portuguese "Atlantic Perspective" reflects five centuries
of national development, and Portugal has had a monopoly on strategic
control of the Atlantic approaches to the Mediterranean and Central
Europe since the creation of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949. Spanish
entry into NATO threatens to end that monopoly and weaken Portuguese
leverage within the Alliance. Spanish entry also reawakens a centuries-
old Portuguese fear that its individual identity will be submerged in
that of its bigger and stronger Iberian neighbor.
This chapter focuses on problems surrounding the restructuring
of the NATO military command to accomodate Spanish accession, and tne
interaction between this effort and Portuguese interests. It also
goes beyond the command structure problem to discuss how longer term
NATO issues will be affected by the Portuguese-Spanish relationship.
With regard to the command structure question, military command effect-
iveness will be a consideration secondary to political interests in
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the creation of a new command structure. The final proposal accepted
by the Defense Planning Committee will be the one which requires the
lowest cost in political concessions from the concerned states, rather
than the one which is most effective strategically. This precedent
probably will be followed when Spanish and Portuguese interests conflict
concerning future defense planning issues, and for this reason the
Portuguese-Spanish relationship carries the greatest long term signifi-
cance for the Alliance.
Chapter V considers NATO's need for a greater credibility for its
Central Front defense strategy in the context of the Spanish Govern-
ment's eagerness to find a meaningful role for its Army within NATO.
The chapter explores the possibility that the coincidence of the two
problems might present opportunities for simultaneous resolution of
both. The chapter presents an outline of current defense strategy and
discusses its weaknesses. The strategic assets which Spanish accession
will bring to NATO are examined with regard to the contribution they
might make to the defense of the Central Front. Spain's possible con-
tribution is analyzed in two ways: first, in terms of making the present
strategy more credible, and secondly, in terms of alternative strate-
gies which accession might make possible.
Unfortunately, Spanish accession will not improve NATO's position
on the Central Front. The contribution which Spanish forces might make
to the Central Front will not be sufficient to improve the credibility
of the present strategy, while the commitment of the Federal Republic
of Germany and the Alliance to forward defense will not allow alternative
strategies to be considered seriously. The political interests of the
Federal Republic will be the primary obstacle to a reevaluation of
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defense strategy which might otherwise follow Spanish accession. Mone-
theless, it is demonstrated that, although Spanish accession will not
add significantly to the credibility of NATO defense, it will contribute
effectively to the credibility of the NATO deterrent.
Chapter VI synthesizes the effects of the various bilateral issues
on the accession process. These issues did not affect the process
radically because concern for the stability of democracy in Spain pre-
empted bilateral international issues following the February 1981 coup
attempt in Madrid. Although their influence during the accession process
was limited, the issues will have a future bearing on Alliance decision
making processes, with the Gibraltar and Portuguese issues the most
significant. Yet though these issues will create additional discord in
Alliance dialogue, they probably will have no great effect on future
Alliance cohesion. Compared to other controversies which the Alliance
has survived, the issues which Spanish accession brings to NATO are
manageable. The integrity of the Alliance will not be threatened by
Spanish membership, and could even be strengthened.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY
There is little in the way of positive action which the United States
can or should do relative to these issues. The relationships do not lend
themselves to outside arbitration. Instead, what will be demanded of
U.S. leaders is awareness and understanding of the issues involved.
Particularly in the case of the Spanish-Portuguese relationship,
American civilian and military leaders frequently will find themselves
contributing to decisions on issues in which Spanish and Portuguese
interests clash. Several possible examples have been mentioned already;
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military assistance, military command structure reorganization, Iberian
infrastructure development, and arms purchase agreements. Outside of
the NATO framework, bilateral agreements on trade, economic aid, tech-
nological development, and even base rights agreements will have a
bearing on the Spanish-Portuguese relationship. Like an executive
negotiating the salaries of two managers with similar responsibilities,
the United States will have to avoid making too many concessions to
one out of concern for offending the other, or creating precedents on
whicn the other may capitalize.
The Gibraltar situation will demand patience from U.S. leaders, who
must recognize that only time can provide a permanent solution to the
Droblem. The U.S., and the other NATO nations, will best serve the
cause of the Alliance by standing back and allowing the Spanish, British,
and Gibral tarians to proceed at their own pace.
In the matter of the Spanish Army's role in NATO, the United States'
best opportunity for a positive contribution will be at the military
staff level, where recommendations will be formulated for presentation
to NATO's Defense Planning Council. By ensuring that its representatives
to these staff positions are fully aware of all the issues involved, the
U.S. will best serve its own and Alliance interests. Once the staff
members are properly prepared for their assignments, only their own
imagination and judgment can provide the final solution.
Against Soviet interference, NATO's best defense will remain an
emphasis on the common principles of sovereignty, democracy, and freedom
which have held the Alliance together for 33 years. Whatever other
issues divide the Alliance, the Soviet Union will not be able to tear
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apart the :iorth Atlantic Treaty Organization if its members keep faith
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